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Abstract 
The second-best theory of corruption includes predictions that corruption may be introduced 
as a second-best option in dealing with burdensome bureaucracy, leading to more efficiency. 
One of the predictions in the theory postulates that on average, paying for a better position in 
a queue (bribes) should be negatively correlated with time delays, meaning that paying bribes 
would reduce waiting time in a queue. Further, the theory on corruption predicts that the 
relationship between paying bribes and time delays should vary across companies, with those 
companies having the highest opportunity cost of waiting as well as lower costs of corruption 
being more willing to pay for a better position in the queue, and thereby shortening the waiting 
times.  
This master’s thesis examines the relationship between bribes and waiting times in ports and 
investigate the heterogeneity across firms depending on their home country’s corruption level. 
Our data are inconsistent with the prediction that corruption shortens waiting times. According 
to the specifications in this master’s thesis, all else equal, companies paying bribes in ports 
experience longer waiting times when exporting and/or importing. Further, our specifications 
indicate that the level of corruption in a company’s home country is in fact associated with 
shorter waiting times. The results in this master’s thesis are at odds with the second-best theory 
but do produce evidence that paying companies from more corrupt countries wait less than 
paying companies from less corrupt countries. This implies that companies from more corrupt 
home countries may possess a competitive advantage over companies from less corrupt home 
countries when encountering corruption in ports. 
 
Key words: International trade, Corruption, Time delays. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Motivation and purpose 
The shipping and ports industry play a crucial role in several large economies all over the 
globe.  The international shipping industry is responsible for the carriage of around 90% of 
the world trade value (ICS, 2019). It connects and influences all corners of the world and are 
connected to all industries in some way or form. As companies grow and expand into other 
global markets, shipping becomes an integral part of their day to day operations.  
One large issue for shipping companies is that they almost systematically are asked to pay 
some sort of fee or unformal gift to access ports and/or to be able to clear customs in certain 
countries. We met with a senior executive in a large European shipping company, who 
confirmed that there exists a great number of challenges related to what he referred to as 
illegitimate claims. These types of claims can come in shapes of tariffs, customs requirements, 
shortage, and invoices for administrative services. Refusing to pay such claims, often results 
in large delays. He reported that one day of operating one of their vessels costs between USD 
30.000 to USD 50.000. This tells us that if a shipment is delayed, this would inflict large costs 
on the company1. But how much of the delays in ports can be connected to such corruption? 
And can payments of such illegitimate claims accelerate the time spent in port, so that delays 
are mitigated? These questions are part of the larger understanding regarding the role of 
corruption in private sector development. Currently there are a lot of papers and studies that 
conclude on the negative effect corruption has on the economy, including slowing down 
economic growth by distorting incentives, increase transaction costs and aggravating 
uncertainty, leading to misallocation and underinvestment (Murphy, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1991) 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1993) (Rose-Ackerman, 1997) (Svensson, 2000). Yet there also exists a 
large amount of papers and studies on corruption that tells a different story. This literature 
shows that corruption may have the effect to enhance efficiency by enabling circumvention of 
burdensome business regulations and/or by incentivise bureaucrats or public government 
officials to work harder due to payments from bribes (Leff, 1964) (Organski, 1969) (Lui, 1985) 
(Lien, 1986) 
                                                 
1 Informant A, personal interview, 01.02.2019.  
 7 
In this master’s thesis, we investigate the same issues by examining the relationship between 
paying a bribe and waiting times in ports. We are using firm-level data from The World Bank 
Enterprise Surveys, to more specifically, test two predictions in the model of the second-best 
theory of corruption. The first prediction states that firms paying bribes in ports should get 
through ports faster than companies not paying such bribes. The theory further predicts that 
this relationship is heterogeneous across companies, with companies with a higher opportunity 
cost of waiting, being more willing to pay bribes, and consequently face shorter waiting times. 
Søreide (2016) predicted that a company’s willingness to pay a bribe is largely dependent on 
the cost of corruption. So if the relationship between paying a bribe and time delays is 
heterogenous based on the company’s willingness to pay, this implies that companies with 
lower costs of corruption should go through ports faster. Andvig and Moene (1990) predicted 
that the cost of corruption may vary with the level of corruption, indicating that the higher 
levels of corruption, leads to lower cost of corruption (because companies from more corrupt 
countries are facing lower transaction costs for bribes, smaller chances of detection and lower 
consequences of being caught). The purpose of this study is to examine if companies paying 
bribes have an advantage when encountering corruption in ports. To do this, we use 
econometrical analysis based on data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys to establish 
causality between paying bribes and waiting times in ports.   
The World Bank Enterprise Surveys have been conducted in 145 different countries across 
2006 - 2019 and are well suited for analyzing the association between corruption and time 
delays. It contains company-specific data on corruption in different aspects of their business, 
from clearing ports to other regulatory requirements such as applying for various permits in a 
country.  
This study will contribute to the existing empirical literature on the second-best theory in terms 
of using an up-to-date data sample and investigating the possible effects of corruption on the 
competition aspects between companies in ports. In addition, it would complement and 
broaden economic theory in regards to how corruption distorts economic growth and impedes 
world trade. 
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2. Delays 
2.1 Definition of delays 
D. Hummels, Minor, Reisman, and Endean (2007) asked the question; why don’t countries 
trade more? In their research they found that in discussions about trade barriers, the focus 
usually lies on tariffs. However, Clemens and Williamson (2002) found that average import 
tariffs worldwide dropped from 8,6 to 3,2 percent between 1960 and 1995. D. Hummels et al. 
(2007) then studied; if perhaps nontariff barriers where the prime obstacle to trade and focused 
specifically on the nontariff trade barrier; Time delays. In their study, they combined estimates 
of per day time costs with data on days lost to customs delays and port clearance and found 
that customs delays prove a far greater barrier to trade than applied tariffs. In their study, they 
define time delays as time spent in ports. In our master thesis, we are going to use the same 
definition. We define time delays as the total time spent in port for both importers and 
exporters as they both spend time in ports and are affected by the same aspects.  
There is a wide range of causes for time delays, and one of them are corruption. We want to 
study the effects corruption has on time delays in ports. Therefore, our main variables in this 
master thesis is the average time companies spend in ports for exporting and importing. 
2.2 Cost of time 
Because of large operating costs associated with vessels, we understand that there is a 
substantial cost associated with waiting times for shipping companies. If a vessel is delayed 
in port, this could potentially mean large losses for the company. In addition to increased 
operating costs, delays are also associated with large opportunity costs for the company. If the 
vessel is delayed in a port, it won’t be able to deliver other shipments as fast as if the vessel 
wasn’t delayed. The shipment could be some place more profitable instead of being stuck in 
port. D. L. Hummels and Schaur (2013) stated that lengthy shipping times often result in 
inventory-holdings and depreciation cost on shippers. Inventory-holdings include both capital 
cost of the goods in transit, as well as the need to hold large buffer-stock inventories at the 
final destination to accommodate for the variations in arrival times. Depreciations captures 
any reason that newly produced goods might be preferable than older goods. This could be 
that some technology is rapidly getting obsolete compared to new technology, or simply that 
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when transporting fresh fruit for example, the longer the shipment stays in transit, the less 
fresh the fruit gets. D. L. Hummels and Schaur (2013) estimated that each day in transit is 
worth 0,6 to 2,1 percent of the value of the good being transported. Even though they identify 
the value of time saving from transport modal choice, their estimates also give some 
information about policies and sources of technological change that speed up the transit time. 
For example, imposing strict port security procedures could significantly slow the flow of 
goods, however, streamlining elaborate customs procedures or investing in more efficient port 
infrastructure speeds up the flow of goods. This means that we can consider time spent in ports 
to include several aspects where there is a possibility of increased time delays and thereby 
increased costs. Djankov, Freund, and Pham (2010) investigate this possibility using product-
specific estimates of per day time cost taken from an earlier draft of D. L. Hummels and Schaur 
(2013). They find that countries with long customs delays see reduced trade volumes, and the 
largest reduction in trade occur in the most time sensitive products. 
Taken these findings into account, we can determine that time delays are not only costly for 
the specific firm through operating costs, but it is also costly for countries and consumers as 
delays tends to decrease the amount of trade and slow down speed to market of goods.  
2.3 Delays in ports 
When we examine delays in ports, we consider two different areas of where delays can occur: 
Delays in customs and delays in port. Delays in customs include all the possible time delays 
that can occur in customs. This include, but are not limited to, excessive inspections of cargoes, 
redundant and poorly coordinated procedures, poor communication and information 
management, low-skill levels among staff and corruption. Delays in ports include all the 
possible time delays that can occur in the port itself. This include, but are not limited to, lower 
port efficiency and port quality (ex. a port that has a newer and more modern infrastructure 
may process cargoes faster that ports with an underdeveloped infrastructure) (Freund, 
Hallward-Driemeier, & Rijkers, 2016), corruption and infrequent service: smaller, poorer 
nations distant from major trade lanes receive fewer, less frequent calls from ocean liners (D. 
Hummels, Lugovskyy, & Skiba, 2009). 
Our dependant variable, time spent in ports for exporters and importers, cover both the time 
aspects in ports as well at the time aspects in customs. The variables measure the average 
number of days that it took from the time the establishment’s goods arrived at the ports until 
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the time these goods cleared customs, meaning that the variable cover both areas of time 
delays: Delays in customs and delays in ports. 
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3. Corruption 
3.1 Definition of corruption 
Corruption is deeply normative and has been a subject of major dispute and long-running 
debate (J.S, 1967) (Philp, 1997; Thompson, 1993). Nowak (2001) pointed out that with no 
international legal definition, the definitions of corruption vary across countries and 
disciplines. Due to intergovernmental organizations, such as the OECD, and their efforts to 
implement international conventions, we now see more harmonized laws and regulations on 
the subject (Søreide, 2016). An example of such a convention is the OECDs Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials.  
A common definition of corruption is “the abuse of public power for private benefits” (Bank, 
1997). This definition only considers the power of public entities. However, as Rose-
Ackerman (1998) pointed out, corruption also exists between the interface of public and 
private sector. NORAD (2013) stated that “Corruption applies to any transactions between the 
public and the private sectors where public goods are illegally converted into private benefits”. 
This states that corruption is not only limited to the public sector, but also includes the private 
sector, where large corporations have a substantial role in how public goods can be distributed 
fairly.  
It is necessary to define corruption to have a starting point to tackle the problem. An important 
consideration when defining corruption, is the difference in societies. Johnston (2006) pointed 
out that the terms “abuse”, “public”, “private” and even “benefit” can lead to various degrees 
of ambiguity depending on the country and society. The need for a more common definition 
and understanding of corruption’s diverse forms, is necessary to craft a targeted response and 
also to measure how anticorruption measurements work in practice (Søreide, 2016). 
According to Søreide (2016) there are four conditions that have to be in place for corruption 
to happen. It requires that the decision maker:  
i) Control monetary or non-monetary values  
ii) Have discretionary authority to make decisions  
iii) Offer biased decision making unhindered by the risk of detection (and reaction) 
as well as the moral costs  
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iv) Encounter counterparts willing to pay for biased decisions (unhindered by risk 
and moral costs.  
The different criteria can be met on various levels, depending on the arenas they occur. The 
more they are met, the higher the risk of corruption. Opportunities to seize benefits through 
some form of power misuse differs across countries, sectors and organizations. These 
characteristics will often contribute in determining the size of the bribe. Whether 
opportunities for corruption are present, does not only depend on the individual, but also on 
the extent to which the environment allows corruption to endure (Søreide, 2014). An 
example is formulated in Klitgaard (1988), stating that “Corruption equals Monopoly plus 
Discretion, minus Accountability”.  This formulation is used to identify and analyze 
situations conducive to bureaucratic corruption. By having monopoly power or de facto 
monopoly power, the decision maker possesses an opportunity to create fictive shortages to 
exploit situations where he or she can extract bribes (Søreide & Rose-Ackerman, 2017). In 
addition, if the decision maker possesses discretionary power, the decision maker may 
choose among the bidders, and thereby increase the bribe amount. Lack of accountability 
will often lead to elimination of the decision makers perceived risk of detection, as well as 
moral costs. This is a typical situation where corruption is more likely to endure.  
 
Taken these four criteria into consideration, a useful definition of corruption could be; “a 
trade in decisions that should not be for sale” (Søreide, 2016). By using this perspective, 
corruption can be viewed as a deal between two (or several) parties. Without an individual 
with delegation authority willing to sell a decision, and without a buyer willing to pay for it, 
there will be no deal. The scarcer values that are controlled by the decision maker, the higher 
the price of the payment. This catches both the collusive and compensational nature of 
corruption, and hints at the negative consequences (Søreide, 2016). The compensation is the 
price for the moral costs as well as the risk regarding a deviation from the intuitional specific 
rules and virtues. This is illustrated in Figure 1: 
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Figure 1: A trade in decisions: 
 
By defining corruption as a trade in decisions that should not be for sale, we can consider the 
asymmetric allocations of bargaining powers between the parties involved. By understanding 
this relationship, it is easier to identify the degree of extortive and collusive corruption. The 
level of corruption in a transaction will be determined by a variety of elements within the 
environment of the “deal” (Søreide, 2016). This environment includes the involved parties’ 
individual traits and incentives, institutional qualities, the characteristics of the sector/market 
which the deal exists within, politics, state administration and the criminal justice system, as 
well as the level of opportunities and mutual trust between the parties involved. In order to 
determine the level of corruption, we need to assess these elements. This is illustrated in 
Figure 2:  
  
 
Figure 1: Definition of corruption: «A trade in decision that 
shouldn’t be for sale” (Søreide, 2016) 
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Figure 2: Corruption as a “Deal”: 
 
For example, there is a higher risk of corruption if the level of competition in the market, as 
well as performance bonuses to senior management are high, combined with low 
institutional qualities and poor enforcement systems (Taylor, 2016).  
 
Based on this, we could define corruption in our master thesis as “a trade in decisions that 
should not be for sale”. This speaks to both the discretionary powers of port and customs 
officers, as well as their control of the non-monetary value; time. We want to study the effects 
of corruption on time delays in ports. Therefore, our main control variable in this master thesis 
is a dummy for whether a company paid for a better position in the port queue, proxied by the 
response to whether or not the companies was expected to pay a bribe when dealing with port 
officials. Bribes is a classic transaction between two or several parties and may unfold between 
both public and/or private entities, and thus are covered by all the definitions mentioned.  
3.2 Cost of corruption in the maritime industry 
The World Trade Organization, WTO, has estimated that the value of merchandise, exported 
by  WTO-members in 2019, was 19.8 trillion USD (Organization, 2019). With the increasing 
 
Figure2: Source: The authors remake of the model 
described in (Søreide, 2016).) 
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globalization, there has been a surge in global trade, where the maritime industry plays an 
important role. However, because of all the different interactions with government, custom 
and/or port officials, there is found to be an increased risk of taking part of corrupt activities. 
The United Nations (UN) estimated that corruption can add 10 % or more to the cost of doing 
business internationally (Deloitte, 2015).  
In addition, a study by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (the 
OECD) in 2014 showed that the transportation and storage industry is second in relation to 
where bribes are most paid (OECD, 2014). One of the reasons for this, is that there are several 
jurisdictions and stakeholders involved in a single shipment. Secondly, corruption and bribery 
can be a matter of contention depending on the society, and certain types of corruption may 
be socially accepted in some parts of the world. Therefore, fighting corruption sometimes 
mean challenging the social norm of some countries (Watch, 2012). 
 The shipping sector is said to have a unmatured anti-corruption compliance culture 
(Chambers, 2015).  However, we are witnessing more actions towards a better compliance 
culture in the sector. A good example is The Maritime Anti-Corruption Network, which had 
over a hundred registered members in 2018 (MACN, 2019). Looking at these initiatives 
against corruption, it is fair to state that most companies experiencing some type of corruption 
in their maritime operations, view this as a competitive restraint rather than an advantage.  
Furthermore, an empirical study done in 2008, investigated how bureaucrats set bribes in ports, 
and whether these payments imposed significant economic costs (Sequeira & Djankov, 2008). 
The study looked at bribe payments at ports of Southern Africa, and found that bribes are often 
product-specific, frequent and substantial. Bribes represented up to 14% increase in total 
shipping costs for a standard 20ft. container, and a 600% increase in the monthly salary for a 
port official. Further, the study identified three leading effects: diversion, congestion and 
reduced port revenues. First, the diversion effect explained that shipping companies tend to 
divert to less corrupt ports. The study found that some firms chooses to travel, on average, an 
additional 322 kms – more than doubling their transportation costs – just to avoid ports with a 
high level of corruption. The costs associated with re-routing were eight times higher than the 
actual bribe payment, showing that some shipping companies are willing to divert from the 
uncertainty of bribe payments (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993). Secondly, the re-routing resulted in 
a congestion in the least corrupt ports, which contributed to more imbalanced flows which 
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added to the total transportation costs. Finally, the corruption at ports resulted in less revenue 
to the ports. 
Taken these findings into account, we can determine that corruption is not only costly for the 
specific firm through increased trade costs, but it is also costly for countries and consumers as 
corruption tends to decrease the amount of trade and lead to congestion in non-corrupt ports, 
which again may lead to longer waiting times.  
3.3 Corruption in ports 
Ferreira, Engelschalk, and Mayville (2007) stated that weak institutions, poor governance and 
under resourced customs services are the main cause to the lack of control in many African 
ports. Corruption involves various agents, including port operators and custom officials. The 
lack of adequate supervision creates opportunities for corruption to endure. As described in 
section 3.1, this can result in discretionary power, which makes corruption easier to 
implement. 
This is illustrated by Sequeira and Djankov (2014), who examined in great detail the ways in 
which corruption in ports emerge. By studying two different ports; Maputo and Durba in South 
Africa, they found that the port officials with shorter time horizon, broader discretionary 
powers and more frequent interactions with companies, are more likely to engage in 
corruption. The study distinguished between two categories of port officials with different 
opportunities to extract bribes: customs officials, with a full access to information of the 
shipments and wide discretionary powers, and port operators, with less information and less 
discretionary powers. These results illustrate the importance of discretionary powers and the 
control of scarce monetary or non-monetary values, such as time.  
In this master thesis, we want to examine the effects corruption has on time delays by studying 
the queues of vessels in ports. We have established that time delays in ports can have a variety 
of different causes, and corruption is one of them. Corruption within the different port 
processes contribute to delays. Delays imposes increased cost for companies in the form of 
waiting times, increased opportunity costs as well as operation costs. By examining the 
queues, we can try to understand the effects of corruption on time delays found in ports.  
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4. Theory and Hypothesis 
In our research we found two highly relevant theories in the literature that attempts to explain 
the relationship between corruption, productivity and economic growth. There is an extensive 
amount of empirical evidence on these theories, using different types of data, methods and 
countries. Some of the empirical literature on the subject has shown to proof different results. 
In the following, we explain the two theories and why these are relevant to our study.  
4.1 The distortion theory of corruption 
The distortion theory of corruption states that corruption tends to distort allocation of resources 
through an increase in the returns to rent-seeking relative to productive activities (Baumol, 
1996). An economy or a business environment that is exposed to high levels of corruption, 
may encourage economic agents to reduce interactions with official authorities and/or the 
state, and delaying expansion and resort to operating in informal sectors of the economy. 
Corruption and large informal economies tends to make entry of new firms difficult (Djankov, 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2002). This corroborate the arguments made in 
(Baumol, 1996). However, the arguments made by Djankov et al. (2002) are irrelevant when 
we are talking about institutions that are “natural monopolies”. This is because whether there 
is corruption or not, the state would not permit private investments in these institutions. A 
good example is ports, which contains both customs and port administrations. No private entity 
or individual would be allowed to have a private customs or port administration service for 
the country.  
According to the distortion theory, corruption distorts the allocation of entrepreneurial talents 
by ensuring that the entrepreneur devotes greater efforts to obtaining licenses and preferential 
access to the market than to improve productivity. Corrupt business environments tend to 
affect technological progress and investment. Resources meant for investments in key 
infrastructures that is instrumental for efficient public institutions, such as ports and customs, 
will be diverted into private pockets, and individuals or institutions that benefit from such 
activities, will lobby to retain regulatory cumbersome that do encourage corruption.  
Many of the empirical studies conducted on the distortion theory of corruption conclude that 
corruption retards economic growth, by distorting incentives, increasing transaction costs and 
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aggravating uncertainty, leading to misallocation and underinvestment (Murphy et al., 1991) 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1993) (Rose-Ackerman, 1997) (Mauro, 1995) (Svensson, 2000).  
The literature consists of extensive theoretical analysis on the relationship between 
regulations, corruption, and bureaucratic efficiency. For example, Rose-Ackerman (1975) 
considered the relationship between market structure and the incidence of corrupt dealings in 
the government contracting process. Rose-Ackerman (1999) investigated how high levels of 
corruption limit investment and growth, and can lead to ineffective government. Cadot (1987) 
introduced a model for the allocation of permits by officials. They systematically analyzed the 
implication of different informational assumptions. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) introduced two 
propositions about corruption; (1) the structure of government institutions and of the political 
process are very important determinants of the level of corruption, and (2) the illegality of 
corruption and the need for secrecy make it much more distortionary and costly than its sister 
activity, taxation. Acemoglu and Verdier (2000) looked into how government intervention 
creates room for corruption by transferring resources from one party to another. Freund et al. 
(2016) examined the relationship between request for bribes and the time it takes to complete 
various regulatory requirements getting different permits. Onogwu (2018) analyzed the effect 
of corruption on the efficiency of customs service in a few selected African countries.  
Time delays directly affects firm performance and are suitable for assessing the effectiveness 
of a government, both within and across countries. In addition, there is an ample evidence 
stating that impact of regulation on economic outcomes is contingent on its implementation, 
and that time delays impedes trade (Clemens & Williamson, 2002) (D. L. Hummels & Schaur, 
2013) (D. Hummels et al., 2007) (Djankov et al., 2010). 
In this master’s thesis, we are examining the effects of corruption on time delays in ports. Ports 
are so called “natural monopolies” and the service providers administrating these institutions 
possesses high levels of discretionary powers to allocate resources as they see fit, deciding 
which shipment that goes through the port first and last. This imposes a queueing process on 
the shipments. To examine the effect corruption has on time delays in ports, we consider this 
queueing process by looking at the framework of another theory of corruption; “the second-
best theory”.  
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4.2 The second-best theory of corruption 
The second-best theory is mostly known for the name “Grease-the-wheels”. This theory 
postulates that firms, corporations, organizations or countries with a large amount of 
bureaucracy, corruption becomes the second-best option in dealing with burdensome 
regulatory requirements. Some would argue that governments create distortions by having a 
high level of bureaucracy. Corruption can therefore be a tool that helps eliminate these 
distortions and increase the smoothness of the institutions. The second-best theory states that, 
given a problem, the introduction of another problem will help to eliminate the earlier problem 
(Onogwu, 2018). An example is that time delays imposes increased costs on companies. When 
a shipment is arriving at port, it must go through bureaucratic processes in both the port, as 
well as the customs. These processes impose time delays on the shipment. By introducing the 
problem of corruption, this could speed up the processes and eliminate the time delays.  
Since we are examining port queues, it is useful to consider the theoretical framework of the 
“Grease-the-wheels” -model, that was provided by Lui (1985). He had a hypothesis stating 
that the size of bribes by different companies represents the opportunity cost of not engaging 
in corruption related activities. The efficiency of the company could say something about their 
ability and willingness to buy red tape. He stated that more efficient companies were more 
able or willing to buy less effective red tape, which was reflected in less “time tax”.  
Because we are examining the effects of corruption on the bureaucratic harassment of time 
delays in ports, we have interpreted Lui (1985)’s model to better apply to the port analogy. 
Postulating an economic model for queuing, were the expected time that a company, paying 
bribe x, spends in a queue is given by function: 
 𝑊(𝑥) =  
𝑟
𝑚[1 − 𝑟𝐵(𝑥∗) + 𝑟𝐵(𝑥)]2
 (1) 
Where 𝑟 is defined as the average amount of companies, 𝑚, multiplied by the average service 
time (1/u); (r =  (
𝑚
𝑢
)). 𝑥∗ represents the maximal bribe payment received (making the payer 
of this amount place in front of the queue). The distribution function of 𝑥 is given by 𝐵(𝑥), 
such that 𝐵(𝑥∗) is the proportion of companies who choose to stay in the queue. The queuing 
model assumes that companies arrive at the end of the queue. At the other end of the queue, 
there is a service provider. In our case, this service provider may be a port agent, such as a 
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port officer or a customs officer, providing some sort of service to the company (ex. port access 
or customs clearance). Each company may have a different value of time, 𝑣. The cumulative 
distribution function of the value of time, 𝑣, is represented by 𝐴(𝑣), and it is assumed that this 
is known to the company. When companies come to the end of the queue, there is two paths 
that can be chosen. Either choose to not join the queue or pay a bribe, 𝑥, to the port agent to 
receive a better position in the queue. The company will be placed in front of those who bribes 
𝑥′ < 𝑥 and behind those who bribe 𝑥′′ ≥ 𝑥. Further, Lui (1985) proposes that for any given 
𝐴(𝑣), the bribing function 𝑥(𝑣) results in an social optimal queue if 𝑥(𝑣) is a strictly 
increasing function of v. The intuition behind this is; to minimize the average value of time 
costs of the queue, we need to rank companies according to their values of time so that 
companies with higher values of time are placed in front of those with lower values, and 
therefore are served first. Since the queuing rule is to rank companies according to 𝑥, it is 
necessary to also rank them according to 𝑣 for any 𝑥(𝑣) that is a strictly increasing function 
of 𝑣. Since the rankings of 𝑥 is the same as the ranking of 𝑣, we have:  
 𝐵[𝑥(𝑣)] = 𝐴(𝑣) (2) 
Then it follows that:  
 𝐵′(𝑥)𝑥′(𝑣) = 𝐴′(𝑣) (3) 
To guarantee social optimality, we include a restriction that x’(v) > 0, so that x∗ = x(v∗), and 
therefore 
 𝐵(𝑥∗) = 𝐴(𝑣∗) (4) 
Each company has a given value of time 𝑣 and want to optimize the net gain by receiving the 
specific service. For example, a shipping company would want to maximize the net gain of 
exporting goods to a given country. This implies that they also would want to maximize the 
net gain of accessing the port or clearing customs for the specific country they are exporting 
to. Therefore, they would want to maximize 
 max
𝑥
𝐺 = 𝑃 − [𝑥 + 𝑣𝑊(𝑥)] (5) 
were 𝐺 being the expected net gain and 𝑃 is the monetary value of the specific service that the 
company seeks to obtain (ex. port access or clearing customs). The term in the square bracket 
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represents the expected total cost of joining the queue, which include a bribe, 𝑥, plus the value 
of time multiplied with the expected time the company spends in the queue.  
Given equation (1), we can also write this as:  
 max
𝑥
𝐺 = 𝑃 − 𝑥 −
𝑣𝑟
𝑚[1 − 𝑟𝐵(𝑥∗) + 𝑟𝐵(𝑥)]2
 (6) 
The first order condition then becomes:  
 
𝑑𝐺
𝑑𝑥
= −1 +
2𝑟2𝑣𝐵′(𝑥)
𝑚[1 − 𝑟𝐵(𝑥∗) + 𝑟𝐵(𝑥)]3
= 0 (7) 
which we equal to zero in order to find the value x that maximizes (or minimizes) the net gain 
𝐺. We write this more explicit by substitute equation (2), (3) and (4) into equation (7):  
 𝑥′(𝑣) =
2𝑟2𝑣𝐴′(𝑣)
𝑚[1 − 𝑟𝐴(𝑣∗) + 𝑟𝐴(𝑣)]3
 (8) 
To solve this, we integrate it with respect to 𝑣:  
 𝑥 = ∫
2𝑟2𝑣𝐴′(𝑣)𝑑𝑣
𝑚[1 − 𝑟𝐴(𝑣∗) + 𝑟𝐴(𝑣)]3
+ 𝐾 (9) 
where 𝐾 is a constant to be determined.  
To determine whether equation (9) represents the value 𝑥 that maximizes or minimizes the net 
gain G, we derive the equation again in order for us to determine if 
𝑑2𝐺
𝑑𝑥2
< 0 𝑜𝑟 
𝑑2𝐺
𝑑𝑥2
> 0 
 
𝑑2𝐺
𝑑𝑥2
= (
2𝑟2𝑣
𝑚
)
[1 − 𝑟𝐵(𝑥∗) + 𝑟𝐵(𝑥)]𝐵′′(𝑥) − 3𝑟[𝐵′(𝑥)]2
[1 − 𝑟𝐵(𝑥∗) + 𝑟𝐵(𝑥)]4
 (10) 
To simplify this, we use equation (7) to get expressions for B’(x) and B’’(x):  
 
𝑑2𝐺
𝑑𝑥2
= 
−1
𝑥′(𝑣)𝑣
 (11) 
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Equation (11) is negative for 𝑣 > 0. By assumption, negative values of 𝑣 are not allowed, 
because this would indicate that the company have negative value of time. Thereby, we find 
that the value 𝑥 given in equation (9) gives a maximum net value 𝐺. If 𝑣 = 0, we see from 
equation (6) that the maximum of 𝐺 occurs at the lowest permissible value of 𝑥, indicating 
that if companies have a value of time equal to 0, the company would want to pay as little as 
possible to better its position in the queue. We also see that given equation (8), an increase in 
the value of time 𝑣, would result in an increase in the bribe 𝑥. This makes sense as companies 
with a larger value of time would seek to get through the queue as fast as possible, and 
therefore be more willing to pay for a better position. However, equation (8) is only positive 
if the queue does not get infinitely long, because then the term rA(v∗) must be less than 1, and 
therefore 𝑥′(𝑣) must be positive.  
To determine 𝑣∗, we recall that 𝑥∗ is the largest bribe paid by a company in the queue, and 𝑣∗ 
is the corresponding value of time. For this company, the expected net gain must pe positive. 
Otherwise, he will not join the queue. So, as long as 𝑣∗ < 𝑣 for another company, that is, some 
companies will not join the queue, the gain for the company with time value 𝑣∗, cannot be 
positive. Otherwise, companies with a value of time just above, will also join the queue. 
Hence, for v∗ < v, G(x∗) = P– x∗ − vW(x∗) = 0. From equation (1), we get that 
 𝑥∗ = 𝑃 −
𝑣∗𝑟
𝑚[1 − 𝑟𝐵(𝑥∗) + 𝑟𝐵(𝑥∗)]2
 (12) 
= 𝑃 −
𝑣∗𝑟
𝑚
 
By adding another assumption that 𝐴(𝑣) is a uniform distribution function from 𝑣 = 0 to 𝑣 =
𝑣1, we get:  
 𝐴(𝑣) = 𝐴𝑣 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑣 ℇ [0, 𝑣1] (13) 
Then, we end up with a more explicit bribing function than shown in equation (9):  
 𝑥 = ∫
2𝑟2𝑣𝐴𝑑𝑣
𝑚[1 − 𝑟𝐴𝑣∗ + 𝑟𝐴𝑣]3
+ 𝐾 (14) 
Solving this bribe function gives:  
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 𝑥 =
1
𝑚𝐴(1 − 𝑟𝐴𝑣∗)
−
𝑣𝑟
𝑚(1 − 𝑟𝐴𝑣∗ + 𝑟𝐴𝑣)2
−
1
𝑚𝐴(1 − 𝑟𝐴𝑣∗ + 𝑟𝐴𝑣)
+ 𝐾 (15) 
We understand that the company with the lowest value of time does not pay any bribe. Because 
x’(v) > 0, other companies with higher values of time always pay higher bribes. If the 
company with the lowest value of time pays a positive bribe, it can always improve its gain 
by paying less without affecting the time he expects to spend in the queue. By looking at 
equation (15), we see that if 𝑣 = 0 we get 𝑥 = 0. This condition can be used for 𝐾. The bribing 
function now becomes 
 𝑥 =
1
𝑚𝐴(1 − 𝑟𝐴𝑣∗)
−
𝑣𝑟
𝑚(1 − 𝑟𝐴𝑣∗ + 𝑟𝐴𝑣)2
−
1
𝑚𝐴(1 − 𝑟𝐴𝑣∗ + 𝑟𝐴𝑣)
 (16) 
Now, if we substitute 𝑣 = 𝑣∗ into equation (16), we obtain:  
 𝑥∗ =
1
𝑚𝐴(1 − 𝑟𝐴𝑣∗)
−
𝑣∗𝑟
𝑚
−
1
𝑚𝐴
 (17) 
If we combine equation (12) and (17), we end up with an expression for 𝑣∗:  
 𝑣∗ =
𝑚𝑃𝐴
𝑟𝐴(1 + 𝑚𝑃𝐴)
 (18) 
Which is simplified by defining 𝑧 = 𝑚𝑃𝐴:  
 𝑣∗ =
𝑧
𝑟𝐴(1 + 𝑧)
 (19) 
By assuming that Av₁ = 1, we write equation (19) as:  
 𝑣∗ =
𝑧𝑣1
𝑟(1 + 𝑧)
 (20) 
The condition that v∗ < v₁ is therefore equivalent to 
 𝑟 >
𝑧
1 + 𝑧
 (21) 
In other words, equation (19) holds if equation (21) is true. If (21) holds we have that v∗ <
v₁ (only some companies join the queue), and we can substitute equation (19) into equation 
(16) and obtain this bribing function:  
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 𝑥 =
1
𝑚𝐴
(
 1 + 𝑧 −
𝑟𝐴𝑣
{[
1
(1 + 𝑧)
] + 𝑟𝐴𝑣}
2 −
1
[
1
1 + 𝑧] + 𝑟𝐴𝑣)
  (22) 
And by supposing that r ≤
𝑧
(1+𝑧)
 (so we again have v∗ < v), we get that all companies decide 
to join the queue, and equation (22) becomes: 
 𝑥 =
1
𝑚𝐴(1 − 𝑟)
−
𝑣𝑟
𝑚(1 − 𝑟 + 𝑟𝐴𝑣)2
−
1
𝑚𝐴(1 − 𝑟 + 𝑟𝐴𝑣)
 (23) 
By using the same assumption as mentioned in equation (20), Av₁ = 1, we see that 𝑥′(𝑣) is 
positive for both equations (22) and (23), indicating that by increasing the value of time, we 
get an increase in bribe amount. Equation (22) and (23) express the bribe 𝑥 in terms of the 
parameters 𝑚, 𝑟, 𝐴, 𝑃 and the variable 𝑣. These expressions state that if a company know their 
own values of time, they can compute the optimal bribes they should pay. 
Further, Lui (1985) also postulates a model to calculate the optimal speed of service in order 
to investigate the effects that different speeds of service have on the total net gain of the port 
agent. This model gives indications of what the port agent is most likely to do in a situation as 
described above.  
By estimating the average bribe paid to the port agent by incoming companies: 
 ?̅? = ∫ 𝑥(𝑣)𝐴𝑑𝑣
𝑣∗
0
 (24) 
where 𝑥(𝑣) is the bribing function given by (22) if 𝑟 ≥
𝑧
(1+𝑧)
 and given by (23) if 𝑟 <
𝑧
(1+𝑧)
. 
Since on the average there are 𝑚 companies coming to the queue, the average bribe revenue 
is 𝑚?̅?. Now we study what happens to the average bribe revenue, 𝑚?̅?, if the service time, 
1
𝑢
 
changes by one time-unit. We see that if we have 𝑟 <
𝑧
(1+𝑧)
 (then 𝑣∗ = 𝑣₁, and all companies 
join the queue), we get that 
𝑑?̅?
𝑑𝑟
> 0, since 𝑟 =
𝑚
𝑢
, for fixed amount 𝑚. We also see that if we 
assume 𝑟 >
𝑧
(1+𝑧)
, companies with 𝑣 > 𝑣∗ will not join the queue and do not pay any bribe. 
By assuming this, we see that 
𝑑?̅?
𝑑𝑟
< 0. 
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By considering the effects of changing the speed of service on the average revenue received 
by the port agent per period of time, equation (22) and (23) indicates that if 𝑟 <
𝑧
(1+𝑧)
, 
increasing the average service time per company, 
1
𝑢
, will cause the average bribe revenue 
received by the port agent to increase. However, if 𝑟 ≥
𝑧
(1+𝑧)
, increasing 
1
𝑢
 will cause the 
average bribe revenue received by the port agent to decrease. This means that the port agent 
will have an incentive to speed up the service time, but if the service speed becomes too fast, 
then the value of time would be lower, and there wouldn’t be any incentives for the companies 
to pay bribes. In places with burdensome regulations, we can imagine that the service speed is 
longer compared to places with less burdensome regulation. Therefore, port agents in places 
with more burdensome regulations have a better potential to receive a larger bribe revenue by 
speeding up the service times. Therefore, this indicates that more burdensome regulations will 
cause bribes to be more beneficial.  
The second-best theory has not been without criticism. Kaufmann and Shang-Jin (1999) 
argued that Lui (1985) treated regulatory burden (such as delays or time spent in ports) as 
exogenous and independent of the incentives of port agents to take bribes. Because of this 
assumption, Kaufmann and Shang-Jin (1999) argued that Lui’s theory was a partial 
equilibrium in nature, but may not hold in a general equilibrium. 
The general problem with treating an endogenous variable as an exogenous is that the 
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜇𝑖, 𝑥𝑖) ≠ 0 (𝑒. 𝑖.  𝐸(𝜇𝑖|𝑥𝑖) ≠ 0). The variable, 𝑥𝑖, is thereby not an exogenous variable, 
but endogenous, indicating that the error term, 𝜇𝑖, is not independent of the exogenous 
variable. The problem with this is that the coefficient of 𝑥𝑖 may be biased, meaning that it may 
explain more than just the effect of variable 𝑥𝑖. For example, if the bureaucratic harassments 
(such as delays in ports) is treated as exogenous when it instead is endogenous, this implies 
that the observed effect (the coefficient) of the bureaucratic harassment is biased, and do not 
represent the true effect of this parameter.  
 Bardhan (1997) stated that in the second-best theory; it is usually presumed that a given set 
of distortions are mitigated or circumvented by the effects of corruption; but quite often these 
distortions and corruption are caused or at least preserved or aggravated by the same factors. 
He further stated that the distortions are not exogenous to the system and are instead often part 
of the built-in corrupt practices. It is possible to change and/or modify the incentives of the 
port agents using specific measures, hereby exploit the regulatory burdens of a country, 
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endogenously. Kaufmann and Shang-Jin (1999) argues that even within a country, because the 
port agents have discretionary power with a given regulation, corrupt port agents can 
“customize” the nature and amount of harassments on companies to maximize the bribes. In 
other words; they would ask for bribe amounts according to the company’s ability to pay. They 
postulated a model that builds on the insight that bureaucratic harassments may be endogenous 
instead of exogenous.  
Because we are examining the effects of corruption on the bureaucratic harassment of time 
delays in ports, we have interpreted Kaufmann and Shang-Jin (1999)’s model to better apply 
to the port analogy. Their model is a Stackleberg game between a rent-seeking government 
official (in our case; a port agent, such as a port or customs officer), and a representative 
company k. The port agent moves first to impose time delays in order to maximize bribe intake, 
and the company which is the price taker, moves next to choose the bribe payment in order to 
maximize the after-bribe profit.  
By using backward induction to solve the equilibrium levels of bribe and red tape, we examine 
the problem faced by the company:  
Suppose 𝑏𝑘 is the bribe amount company k must pay to the corrupt port agent, and 𝜋𝑘 is the 
profit the company would have achieved without any time delays from the port agent. Let ℎ𝑘 
be the (nominal) time delay that the port agent imposes on the company. We make the nominal 
time delay company-specific to emphasize that the port agent has discretion over the actual 
implementation of a given time delay. In other words, the time delay can be customized.  
Further, Kaufmann and Shang-Jin (1999) makes a distinction between effective or “real” time 
delays (the time delay that a company actually faces after paying a bribe) and the nominal time 
delay (the time delay announced by the service provider before the company pays the bribe). 
The “real” time delay, 𝑟𝑘, is given by the nominal time delay that the port agent imposes on 
the company, ℎ𝑘, minus a function that describes how bribe payments helps to reduce the 
“real” time delay, 𝑠(𝑏𝑘):  
 𝑟𝑘 = ℎ𝑘 − 𝑠(𝑏𝑘) (25) 
By assuming that 𝑠′(𝑏𝑘) > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠′′(𝑏𝑘) < 0, we see that by holding the nominal time delay, 
ℎ𝑘, constant, more bribery leads to lower effective time delay, but there is a decreasing return 
to paying bribes. We notice here that a narrow version of the second-best theory – that is, if 
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nominal time delay is constant, then bribery and effective time delay are negatively correlated 
– holds by assumption.  
To simplify, Kaufmann and Shang-Jin (1999) assume that the pre-bribery profit, 𝜋𝑘, is 
predetermined. The representative company’s objective is to maximize its post-bribe and post-
delay profit, which is given by  
 Π𝑘,𝑎 = 𝑔(𝑟𝑘)Πk − 𝑏𝑘 (26) 
The first order condition yields an implicit function that relates the optimal amount of bribe 
company k would pay (if without any constraint on the maximum bribe) and the nominal rate 
of time delay, h:  
 −𝑔𝑟(ℎ𝑘, 𝑏𝑘)Π𝑘𝑠𝑏(𝑏𝑘) = 1 (27) 
This defines an optimal bribery schedule:  
 𝑏𝑘 = 𝐵(ℎ𝑘) (28) 
By differentiating the first-order condition, we can see that the bribery schedule is upward-
sloping:  
 
𝑑𝑏𝑘
𝑑ℎ𝑘
=
𝑔′′(𝑟𝑘) 𝑠′(𝑏𝑘)
𝑔′′(𝑟𝑘) (𝑠′(𝑏𝑘))
2
− 𝑔′(𝑟𝑘) 𝑠′′(𝑏𝑘)
> 0 (29) 
Which means that the longer nominal time delays imposed on the company, the higher bribes 
do the company find optimal to give.  
The above bribery schedule assumes that the company must tolerate any level of time delays 
and give bribes accordingly. However, as mentioned in section 3.2 on the cost of corruption, 
the diversion effect demonstrated that companies tend to divert shipping routes to less corrupt 
countries. This indicate that a more relevant case would be that every company has an exit 
option and therefore a maximum time delay it is willing to tolerate. Suppose ℎ𝑘
∗  denotes the 
maximum time delay that company k would tolerate. That is, it can commit not to tolerate 
anything above ℎ𝑘
∗  because of the characteristics of the company, the industry it is in, or the 
source country it is from. With this assumption, the company will no longer solve the 
unconstrained problem stated above. This means that the actual bribe the company will be 
willing to pay is:  
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 𝑏𝑘 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛[𝐵(ℎ𝑘
∗ ), 𝐵(ℎ𝑘)] (30) 
Further, Kaufmann and Shang-Jin (1999) solves the problem faced by the port agent: 
By assuming that the port agent sets the time delay, ℎ𝑘, (for example port delays or customs 
delays) solely for the purpose of extracting bribe payments, and that the port agent’s utility 
function is an increasing function of bribe intake, the port agent would impose just enough 
delays to induce the firm to pay the maximum amount of bribe it is willing to tolerate, namely 
𝑏𝑘
∗ = 𝐵−1(ℎ𝑘
∗ ). In equilibrium, the company would pay exactly 𝑏𝑘
∗ . This implies that nominal 
time delay and bribery are positively correlated across firms.  
By examining the relationship between the effective time delay and the bribery in equilibrium 
we get that:  
 
𝑑𝑟𝑘
∗
𝑑𝑏𝑘
∗ =
𝑑ℎ𝑘
∗
𝑑𝑏𝑘
∗ − 𝑠𝑘(𝑏𝑘
∗) (31) 
We see that equation (31) must be positive, which indicates that companies paying more bribes 
not only face higher nominal time delays, but also have to deal with higher rate of “real” time 
delay. This is contradictory to the second-best theory, and we see from Kaufmann and Shang-
Jin (1999)’s model that if we allow burdensome regulations, such as time delays to be 
endogenously chosen by corrupt port agents, the port agent may charge according to the 
company’s “ability to pay” by raising the nominal time delay. This would mean that we should 
see a positive, rather than a negative, correlation between the “real” time delay and bribes in 
equilibrium across companies.  
Summarized, the second-best theory generally postulates three predictions; firms confronted 
with high levels of corruption, should get things done faster, given that all other variables stay 
the same. It also states that this relationship is heterogeneous across both firms and countries, 
with firms with a higher opportunity cost of waiting being willing to engage in corrupt 
activities and consequently facing shorter waiting times, and bribing being more beneficial 
when regulations is considered to be burdensome, in such a way that the relationship between 
the level of corruption and waiting times should be stronger in countries considered to have 
more burdensome regulations. By examining the theoretical framework in (Lui, 1985) on the 
second-best theory, we see that firms with a higher value of time is more willing to pay for a 
better position in the queue. Even though the empirical evidence in  (Lui, 1985) proved 
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corruption to enhance efficiency, (Kaufmann & Shang-Jin, 1999) is a good example of 
empirical evidence proving the opposite results, stating that paying bribes lead to inefficiency 
and longer time delays. Kaufmann and Shang-Jin (1999)’s theory was, however, criticized for 
not assessing heterogeneity.  
4.3 Heterogeneity 
According to the second-best theory, the relationship between bribes and time delays is 
heterogeneous, depending on firm’s ability and willingness to pay and avoid bribes. In this 
master’s thesis, we are studying the relationship between paying bribes and the speed through 
ports, and concentrate on the parts of Lui (1985)’s model that addresses the heterogeneity, 
depending on a company’s willingness to pay.   
Freund et al. (2016) assessed this heterogeneity by using a simple interaction model, 
interacting a proxy for bribe demands with a proxy for productivity, size and magnitude of 
bribes. They found that policy implementation times was longer for larger, more productive 
firms, but shorter for companies with increased magnitude of bribes. Thus, the effects in the 
study was not statistically significant, and therefore, the null hypothesis that more productive 
and/or larger firms are not able to get things done faster could not be rejected. However, there 
seems that examining the relationship between a home country’s level of corruption and time 
delays in ports has been neglected to date.  
Empirical explanations on the determinants of a country level of corruption was provided by 
Søreide (2016), stating that the level of corruption and its consequences depends on the reasons 
why corrupt acts occur and the frequency with which these reasons are presented. Although 
corruption may occur in many different situations, there are three criteria that are found in 
most corrupt countries: unchecked state administrative authorities; government regulation of 
the private sector; secrecy in the world of business; and unchecked political spending (Søreide, 
2016).  
As in any other markets, a company’s willingness to pay depends on the value at stake for the 
buyer, including monetary and nonmonetary values. In our master’s thesis, we are specifically 
looking at the nonmonetary value of time. As we have illustrated with the help of Lui (1985)’s 
framework for the second-best theory; companies having a higher value of time (ex. large 
opportunity costs of waiting in ports) are more willing to pay for a better position than 
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companies with a value of time close to zero. Søreide (2016) further explains that the 
willingness to pay will also depends on the cost, which in a corruption setting refers to the risk 
for the company of getting caught and the consequences that the company will face if caught. 
Therefore, in order to examine a company’s willingness to pay, it is necessary to consider the 
risks and consequences of corruption. 
The framework of the second-best theory provided by Lui (1985), explained that companies 
has a given value of time 𝑣 and wants to optimize the net gain by receiving a specific service. 
For example, a shipping company would want to maximize the net gain of exporting goods to 
a given country. This implies that they also would want to maximize the net gain of accessing 
a port or clearing customs.  
According to Lui (1985)’s model, the company would want to solve the maximization problem 
in equation (5): max
𝑥
𝐺 = 𝑃 − [𝑥 + 𝑣𝑊(𝑥)]. Building on this model, we can express the 
expected net profits of paying for a better position in a port queue for company 𝑖, as 
 𝐺𝑖 = 𝑃𝑖 − [𝑥𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑊(𝑥)] (32) 
Where G is company 𝑖’s net profit of paying for a better position in a queue, P is company 𝑖’s 
total value of going through a port, and the square bracket represents the total cost of joining 
a port queue. We see that the total cost of joining a queue is expressed as the bribe amount, 𝑥, 
paid by company 𝑖, plus the value of company 𝑖’s time, 𝑣, multiplied with the expected time 
that a company, paying bribe 𝑥, spends in a queue, 𝑊(𝑥).  
Based on this expression, heterogeneity may be explained intuitively. Andvig and Moene 
(1990) explained that in countries with higher levels of corruption, the risk of detection can 
easily be mitigated by further corruption. For example, if a corrupt company has been caught 
bribing by another corrupt entity, the company may bribe the other entity for not reporting the 
case. Based on this, we can imagine that companies from home countries with higher levels 
of corruption may have a lower risk of getting caught. Also, as mentioned in section 3.2, 
certain types of corruption may be socially accepted in some countries, meaning that the 
consequences that a company will face if caught, may also be lower in more corrupt home 
countries. This would imply that companies from more corrupt home countries have a lower 
cost associated with every corrupt unit, and therefore are more willing to pay for a better 
position in the port queue. Alternatively, companies from more corrupt home countries may 
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have more experience from corrupt contexts, which allows them to more effectively influence 
through bribery. This implies that companies from more corrupt home countries, may have a 
different relation, 𝑊(𝑥), making the expected time spent in ports shorter for these companies.  
If proven accurate, this would mean that one dollar of bribes paid by companies from high 
corrupt home countries would be more worth than one dollar of bribes paid by companies from 
low corrupt home countries. This further implies that the expected net profits of paying for a 
better position in a port queue, would be higher for companies from more corrupt home 
countries.  
If this is the case, we clearly see a competitive advantage for companies from more corrupt 
countries and may postulate the hypothesis that company’s from more corrupt countries 
possess a competitive advantage when encountering corruption in ports.  
4.4 Hypothesis 
Do companies from more corrupt countries possess a competitive advantage over companies 
from less corrupt countries when encountering corruption in ports? This question is part of a 
larger debate regarding the role of corruption in private sector development. This master thesis 
revisits the issue on whether corruption can enhance efficiency by examining the relationship 
between paying a bribe and the time it takes to clear ports.  
Regarding waiting times in ports, the second-best theory predicts that, all else equal, those 
who pay bribes are likely to go through port administrations and customs faster. So, in total, 
they experience shorter time spent in ports. However, an important implication of the second-
best theory is heterogeneity in the relationship between bribes and time delays across 
companies. The theory predicts that the firms with the highest opportunity cost of waiting, is 
expected to be more willing to pay to decrease waiting times. The willingness to pay is also 
dependent on the cost (Søreide, 2016), and companies from more corrupt home countries seem 
to have a lower cost associated with every corrupt unit, leading to the expectation that 
companies from more corrupt home countries are more willing to pay in order to decrease 
waiting times. In addition, companies from more corrupt home countries seem to be more able 
to effectively influence through bribery, making the expected time spent in ports shorter for 
these companies. 
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Hypothesis #1: Given that the second-best theory predicts that, all else equal, those who pay 
bribes are likely to go through ports faster, we postulate the hypothesis that if companies pay 
for a better position in the port queue, this should decrease the time spent in ports for both 
exporters and importers. 
Hypothesis #2: Based on the queueing model provided by Lui (1985), as well as our reasoning 
in section 4.3, we expect the level of corruption in a company’s home country, to be negatively 
associated with a company’s waiting time in ports. We postulate the hypothesis that companies 
from more corrupt home countries should be expected to have shorter waiting times in ports 
than companies from less corrupt countries.  
However, these hypotheses may not hold if the port agent imposes time delays on the company 
based on their ability to pay. We have seen from Kaufmann and Shang-Jin (1999)’s model that 
if we allow time delays in ports to be endogenously chosen by corrupt port agents, the port 
agent may charge according to the company’s “ability to pay” by raising the nominal time 
delay. This would mean that we should see a positive, rather than a negative, correlation 
between bribes and the “real” time delay across companies. 
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5. Data and Empirical Method 
5.1 The Enterprise Surveys (The World Bank) 
The World Bank Enterprise Surveys are the main data source used in this master thesis. The 
survey has been conducted in 145 countries. Figure 3 demonstrates that corruption is 
considered one of the largest obstacles of doing business by the managers participating in the 
Enterprise Surveys.  
Figure 3: Obstacles of Doing Business: 
 
  
Figure 3: Source: The World Bank Enterprise Survey, various years 
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The Enterprise Surveys are well suited for analysing the association between the level of 
corruption and delays. The data includes detailed information on firm characteristics as well 
as questions on a set of time delays in ports, whether extra payments or gifts (bribes) were 
requested, and the time it took to complete the processes in ports. Our key dependant variable 
is the average amount of time companies spend in ports. The surveys also ask if there was 
requested or expected an informal payment or gift in the process of clearing customs. The 
answer to these questions will be our key explanatory variables. The descriptive statistics in 
Table 1 suggest that demands for such side payments are somehow prevalent with 10,6% and 
9,9% of firms reporting that they have been expected to pay a bribe when clearing ports 
exporting and/or importing respectively.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics:  
Variables Obs Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
Time delays Exporting 18,482 6.583 10.56 0 213 
Time delays Importing 24,029 12.25 18.38 0 365 
Time delays Constr. Permit 14,935 69.81 115.9 0 2,190 
Time delays Operating License  31,197 29.84 115.7 0 9,999 
Time delays Electrical License 17,649 36.30 80.09 0 2,920 
Bribes related to Constr. Permit  18,098 0.198 0.398 0 1 
Bribes related to Oper. License 32,618 0.159 0.366 0 1 
Bribes related to Electric License 19,843 0.157 0.363 0 1 
Bribes related to Exporting 3,588 0.106 0.308 0 1 
Bribes related to Importing 5,484 0.0988 0.298 0 1 
Paid informal payments 25,144 0.256 0.436 0 1 
Labor 145,090 3.251 1.391 0 11.07 
Capital per worker (log) 44,172 13.03 3.248 -5.165 28.20 
Output per worker (log) 128,228 13.53 2.926 -3.401 29.00 
Management’s experience 142,041 17.55 11.20 0 100 
Firm age 143,971 25.75 16.21 1 349 
Public 145,000 0.0499 0.218 0 1 
Private 145,000 0.415 0.493 0 1 
Partnership 145,000 0.0876 0.283 0 1 
Limited Partnership 145,000 0.0854 0.279 0 1 
Sole Proprietorship 145,000 0.344 0.475 0 1 
Foreign Owners 143,516 0.108 0.310 0 1 
Exporter 144,111 0.169 0.375 0 1 
Importer 51,848 0.486 0.500 0 1 
ISO certified 141,498 0.227 0.419 0 1 
Formally registered 124,804 0.883 0.322 0 1 
Government contract 123,702 0.177 0.382 0 1 
Time spent with regulators 134,914 0.655 0.475 0 1 
Visited by tax officials 144,270 0.586 0.492 0 1 
Externally financed 140,860 0.358 0.479 0 1 
Financial Statement Audited 143,187 0.513 0.500 0 1 
Performance bonuses 6,144 0.440 0.496 0 1 
Est. separated from HQ 27,778 0.202 0.401 0 1 
Home Corruption level Exporting 69,301 10.83 12.50 0 79.17 
Home Corruption level Importing 58,490 11.01 9.758 0 38.20 
Corrupt courts 132,124 0.567 0.495 0 1 
Law/Regulations not predictable 24,781 0.551 0.497 0 1 
Burdensome labor regulations 143,735 0.123 0.329 0 1 
Burdensome tax administration 142,313 0.214 0.410 0 1 
Political instability 141,451 0.331 0.471 0 1 
Burdensome trade regulations 132,456 0.147 0.355 0 1 
Burdensome courts 133,139 0.147 0.354 0 1 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data from the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys. 
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A possible weakness in the data is the fact that our key dependant variable only represents 
corruption in regard to clearing customs, and not necessarily the whole port process. Table 2 
presents a description of our main variables used in this master thesis: 
 
Table 2: Description of main variables: 
Variables Variable Description Measure Survey Explanation: 
Independent Variables: 
Time delays 
Exporting: 
How many days it takes 
to clear ports exporting 
The average amount of days 
a company spend in port 
while exporting. 
In the last fiscal year, when 
the company exported goods 
directly, the average number 
of days that it took from the 
time the company’s goods 
arrived to their main point 
of exit (port) until the time 
these cleared customs. 
Time delays 
Importing: 
How many days it takes 
to clear ports importing 
The average amount of days 
a company spend in port 
while exporting. 
In the last fiscal year, when 
the company imported 
goods, the average number 
of days that it took from the 
time the company’s goods 
arrived to their main point 
of entry (port) until the time 
these cleared customs. 
Key Explanatory Variables: 
Bribes related to 
Exporting: 
Dummy for corruption 
related to clearing ports 
exporting  
=1 If the company 
encountered corruption in 
ports while exporting - 
Proxy for paying for a better 
position in ports while 
exporting 
In clearing exports through 
customs, informal 
gift/payment expected or 
requested? Yes/No 
Bribes related to 
Importing: 
Dummy for corruption 
related to clearing ports 
importing 
=1 If the company 
encountered corruption in 
ports while importing - 
Proxy for paying for a better 
position in ports while 
importing 
In clearing imports through 
customs, informal 
gift/payment expected or 
requested? Yes/No 
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Interaction Variables: 
Home Corruption 
level - Exporting 
Proportion of 
corruption in port when 
exporting, sorted by a 
company’s home 
country.  
Corruption level-specific 
variance. Measured by 
percent of companies 
reporting corrupt encounters 
when exporting, sorted by 
home country. 
In clearing exports through 
customs, informal 
gift/payment expected or 
requested? – Sum of “yes” 
answers sorted by the 
company’s home country. 
Home Corruption 
level - Importing 
Proportion of 
corruption in port when 
importing, sorted by a 
company’s home 
country. 
Corruption level-specific 
variance. Measured by 
percent of companies 
reporting corrupt encounters 
when importing, sorted by 
home country. 
In clearing imports through 
customs, informal 
gift/payment expected or 
requested? – Sum of “yes” 
answers sorted by the 
company’s home country. 
Firm Control Variables: 
Labor: Proxy for form size 
The amount of full-time 
employees in the company: 
size-specific variance 
Num. permanent, full-time 
employees at end of last 
fiscal year 
Capital per worker 
(log): 
Proxy for capital 
intensity 
Log of Capital intensity as 
capital divided by labor. 
Capital intensity-specific 
variance 
Cost for establishment to re-
purchase all of its machinery 
+ cost for establishment to 
re-purchase all of its land 
and buildings. designed to 
ascertain the market value of 
the company’s capital. 
Management’s 
experience: 
Managements 
experience expressed in 
years 
Managements experience 
level. Experience-specific 
variance 
How many years of 
experience working in this 
sector does the top manager 
have? 
Firm age: The company’s age 
The age of the company as 
the current year (2019) 
minus the establishment 
year. Age-specific variance 
Year establishment began 
operations 
Public: 
Dummy for whether 
the company is publicly 
traded 
=1 if company is public. 
Ownership-specific variance 
Legal status of the firm 
Private: 
Dummy for whether 
the company is a 
private limited liability 
company 
=1 if company is private. 
Ownership-specific variance 
Legal status of the firm 
Partnership: 
Dummy for whether 
the company is a 
partnership  
=1 if company is a 
partnership. Ownership-
specific variance 
Legal status of the firm 
Government 
contract: 
Dummy for whether 
the company is doing 
business with the 
government 
=1 if company has a 
government contract. Public 
interaction-specific 
variance.  
Government contract 
secured (or attempted) in the 
last 12 months? Yes/No 
Time spent with 
regulators: 
Dummy for whether 
the company has spent 
time with regulators in 
the last fiscal year 
=1 if company spent time 
with regulations. Regulator 
interaction-specific 
variance.  
What % of senior 
management time was spent 
in dealing with govt 
regulations? 
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Country, Sector, Year Dummies: 
Country: Country Dummy Country-specific variance  N/A 
Year: Year Dummy Year-specific variance N/A 
Sector: Sector Dummy Sector-specific variance N/A 
*These are the variables used in our main models. A complete list and description of all variables can be found 
in the Appendix 4. 
 
Even if the data contains large amounts of data on time delays and corruption, it does contain 
a limited number of observations regarding corruption and delays in ports. This makes it 
difficult to control for firm-fixed effects. We are therefore not able to assess whether the 
identifications are based on variation in the incidence of corruption across different types of 
port situations, such as imports, and exports made by the same firm. However, the data enables 
us to study heterogeneity by means of interaction designs. 
With the available cross-sectional data, we are not able to establish causality. We do not have 
precise information under what circumstances bribes are being initiated, by whom, and when 
the requests are made. We also lack information about firms’ and bureaucrats’ subjective 
expectations. In addition, there are some issues when working with data on corruption. This is 
due to the fact that corruption is a hidden phenomenon. Corruption is considered a crime in 
most countries and markets. Therefore, it may exist incentives to keep data on the subject 
hidden. The enterprise surveys contain data on incidences of bribes and questions regarding 
annual amount of informal payments made by the entities. There is a possibility that the 
individuals answering these surveys may have alternative motives when answering. For 
example, information that indicates a firm to be corrupt is considered bad as it may harm the 
reputation of the company (Botn, Dahl, & Kurtmollaiev, 2015). Therefore, it is a possibility 
that the answering individual of the entity will not answer the survey truthfully regarding the 
questions of corruption. The data includes answering options such as “refuse to answer” or 
“don’t know”. These represent proof that the data may somehow be subjective towards the 
motives of the answering individuals.  
However, the data contains high levels of details on both time delays and bribes, which enables 
us to control for an extensive set of observable determinants of corruption. The data set allows 
us to test the predictions in the second-best theory regarding time delays in ports for both 
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exporters and importers. It also allows us to test for heterogeneity which may help us 
understand if the level of corruption of a company’s home country may result in shorter time 
delays, and thereby give companies from more corrupt countries an advantage when 
encountering corruption at ports.  
5.2 Collecting data 
The data used in this master’s thesis, has been collected from The World Bank Enterprise 
Surveys Database (Bank, 2019). The data is available online, but it requires access by 
submitting a request to use the data in specific research. Access was granted by the World 
Bank on august 23rd 2019.  
5.3 Econometric Framework 
Our empirical strategy is to test the effects of corruption on time delays in ports, which implies 
testing the predictions in the second-best theory discussed above. This was done in regards to 
different policy implementations by Freund et al. (2016). Building on the baseline model of 
this study, we want to test the same effects related to ports. The prediction we are focusing on, 
is related to the “grease”-effect of corruption; does corruption imply an efficiency effect on 
the process found in ports, leading to shorter waiting times, and does a home country’s level 
of corruption render companies more willing to pay for a better position in ports. 
This next section explains how we test the predictions of the second-best theory and how we 
test for heterogeneity in the association between bribes and time delays. We present a simple 
OLS-model and an interaction model to test the heterogeneity associated with the level of a 
country’s corruption level. 
To examine the relationship between time delays and bribes, the time spent in ports, that is, 
the average number of days it takes to clear ports when exporting or importing, 𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑖,𝑠,𝑐,𝑡, is 
modelled to be a function of firm characteristics 𝑋𝑖,𝑠,𝑐,𝑡, a dummy indicating whether a 
company paid for a better position in the port queue, 𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑖,𝑠,𝑐,𝑡, proxied by the response to 
whether a bribe was expected when importing and/or exporting, country (𝛼𝐶), sector, (𝛼𝑆), 
year (𝛼𝑌) dummies,  and a random error term 𝜀𝑖,𝑠,𝑐,𝑡:  
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 𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑖,𝑠,𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝐵𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑖,𝑠,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖,𝑠,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛼𝐶 + 𝛼𝑆 + 𝛼𝑌 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑠,𝑐,𝑡 (33) 
The interpretation of the model is: 
𝐻0: 𝛽𝐵 = 0, Corruption is not correlated with time delays in ports.  
𝐻𝐴1: 𝛽𝐵 > 0, Corruption is associated with longer time delays in ports. Which would be in 
accordance with the “Sand in the wheels” -theory.  
𝐻𝐴2: 𝛽𝐵 < 0, Corruption is associated with less time delays in ports. Which would be in 
accordance with the “Grease the wheels” -theory.  
If bribes are a means to get a better position in the port queue and hereby make the company 
go through ports faster, one would expect the incidence to be correlated with less time delays 
(i.e. 𝛽𝐵 < 0). However, if corruption impedes efficiency, we expect bribe incidences to be 
associated with delays (i.e. 𝛽𝐵 > 0).  
There are some problems with this testing model. The relationship between bribes and delays 
could be driven by omitted characteristics on company-level impacting both the duration of 
time delays and the prevalence of bribes. An example of this is a company’s level of 
transparency, such that a company with less transparency would have an increased opportunity 
to bribe without being caught, as well as the port agents may spend more time in extracting 
information or documentation necessary to clear the company out of port. Another example 
that could cause time delays and bribery to be correlated, is complexity. More complex 
companies with poorer infrastructure could be more susceptible to corruption and face longer 
time delays. We can also imagine that firms that already have spent a serious amount of time 
in port, might be more willing to offer a bribe to get the shipment out of port. This opens for 
a reverse causation. Our bribe payment proxy asks specifically about whether there was a bribe 
expectation when clearing customs. This might be confused, leading participants to answer 
“yes” when the firm itself required to pay a bribe instead of the port agent. In addition, one 
might expect a positive correlation between time delays and bribes, simply because ships who 
have waited longer has an increased risk of being asked to pay a bribe.  
We are also using subjective perception of bribe incidences and delay times, which increases 
our concerns for the model, because unobserved firm characteristics, such as the 
entrepreneur’s alternative motive with the surveys or their level of optimism or pessimism, 
could affect the perception of both the delay times and bribe incidences. Furthermore, 
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companies that have experienced a bad encounter with port agents or customs officers, leading 
to longer time spent in ports, might be more dissatisfied and consequently more likely to 
complain about corruption (even if there was none).  
To mitigate endogeneity concerns, we include a set of robustness checks. To start with, we 
include sector, country and year effects. If time delays are sector- or country-specific, this 
would control for congestion within sectors and/or countries. However, our sample of firms, 
both reporting average time spent in ports as well as encountering corruption in ports, is fairly 
small, and therefore we are not able to include all the effects that we want, such as firm fixed 
effects. This means that if time delays are company-specific, we are not able to control for 
congestion within firm as well as within sector, country and years. 
To introduce the analysis on heterogeneity, we first examine the effect of higher levels of 
corruption in a company’s home country on the choice to pay for a better position. The 
corruption level is proxied by the proportion of corrupt bureaucrats in a country. To examine 
this, we run a simple probit model with a binary indicator of whether a company paid for a 
better position, 𝐵𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑖,𝑐,𝑠,𝑡, as the dependant variable. As independent variables, we include a 
variable of the corruption level in a company’s home country. We also include some firm 
controls to check if other characteristics may affect the decision on whether to pay for a better 
position in the queue or not;  
 
𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑖,𝑠,𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑖,𝑠,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛼𝐶 + 𝛼𝑆 + 𝛼𝑌
+ 𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖,𝑠,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑠,𝑐,𝑡 
(34) 
If the corruption level of a company’s home country is affecting the choice of whether to pay 
for a better position, we should expect 𝛽𝐻 to be positive. A positive coefficient means that an 
increase in the corruption level leads to an increase in the predicted probability of paying for 
a better position in the queue.  
According to the theories on the matter of efficiency effects of corruption, that is; “Grease the 
wheels” vs “Sand in the wheels”, there has been some contradictory findings in the literature. 
These findings indicate that there are some firms that benefits from skipping the queue by 
paying bribes, and some firms that don’t. To examine which firms that tends to benefit from 
paying for a better position in the ports, we build on the model of (Freund et al., 2016) 
addressing heterogeneity. According to the second-best theory, the relationship between bribes 
and time delays is heterogeneous, depending on firm’s willingness and ability to pay and avoid 
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bribes. To assess these possibilities (Freund et al., 2016) interacted the bribe indicators with 
an explanatory variable of productivity:  
 
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠 = 𝛽𝐵𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑒 + 𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽𝐵𝑃𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑒
∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽𝑋𝑋 + 𝜀 
(35) 
We have demonstrated that the willingness and ability to pay for a better position also depends 
on the cost, and that the cost of corruption could be lower for companies from more corrupt 
countries. Therefore, building on Freund et al. (2016)’s model, we interact the bribe dummy 
with a proxy for the level of corruption in a company’s home country, estimated as the 
proportion of corrupt encounters in ports for both exporters and importers. To the extent that 
this is a good proxy for the level of corruption in a company’s home country, it allows us to 
test whether higher levels of corruption in a company’s home country is associated with 
shorter time delays, meaning that firms from more corrupt countries benefit from corruption 
in ports. To test this, we use a simple interaction model:  
 
𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑖,𝑐,𝑠,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝐵𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑖,𝑐,𝑠,𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑖,𝑐,𝑠,𝑡
+ 𝛽𝐵𝐻𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑖,𝑐,𝑠,𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑖,𝑐,𝑠,𝑡
+ 𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖,𝑐,𝑠,𝑡 + +𝛼𝐶 + 𝛼𝑆 + 𝛼𝑌 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑐,𝑠,𝑡 
(36) 
We have included a multiplicative term in our regression specification. To interpret this, we 
need to understand the effect of 𝛽𝐵𝐶:  
The average time delay for companies paying for a better position in ports (Paying Companies: 
PC) is given by:  
PC: 
𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑃𝐶
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝐵 + 𝛽𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙
+ 𝛽𝐵𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 
(37) 
We see that, since variable, 𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑒, takes the value of 1 for companies paying for a better 
position, we are left with only the coefficient of 𝛽𝐵 and 𝛽𝐵𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙. By 
simplifying this, we get:  
 𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑃𝐶
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = (𝛽0 + 𝛽𝐵) + (𝛽𝐻 + 𝛽𝐵𝐻)𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙. (38) 
For the non-paying companies (nonPC), where variable, 𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑒, takes the value of 0, we get: 
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nonPC: 𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑃𝐶
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙. (39) 
 We see that at effect of the 𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑒 variable on our specification, 𝛽𝐵, represents the additional 
premium which companies paying for a better position would have over companies not paying 
for a better position, if they both were from a country with a corruption level equal to zero. If 
the corruption level was equal to zero, then both corruption level terms would disappear, and 
the only difference between paying companies and non-paying companies, would be 𝛽𝐵. This 
is the delay premium which paying companies have over non-paying companies, if their home 
country’s corruption level was equal to zero. 
The difference between the two terms including the corruption level variable, is essentially 
that the partial effect of corruption level for paying companies has been boosted by an amount 
equal to 𝛽𝐵𝐻, relative to the non-paying companies. So, this means that if 𝛽𝐵𝐻 > 0, it means 
that the additional effect of one more level of corruption in a company’s home country, is in 
fact greater for paying companies. If 𝛽𝐵𝐻 < 0; the additional effect of having one more level 
of corruption, on average, would cause a smaller increase in time delays for paying companies, 
than it would do for non-paying companies. The latter would also imply that if two companies 
arrive at the port, and both chooses to pay for a better position, the company from the highest 
corrupt country should expect shorter time delays, giving this company an advantage when 
encountering corruption in ports. This is illustrated in figure 4 and figure 5:  
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Figure 4: Average marginal effect of paying a bribe – Exporting 
Figure 5: Average marginal effect of pauing a bribe - Importing  
 
Figure 4. Average marginal effects of paying a bribe on 
time delays, by Home Corruption level when exporting 
estimated by: 
𝑑𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦
𝑑𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑒
= 𝛽𝐵 + 𝛽𝐵𝐻 ∗ 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 
 
 
Figure 5. Average marginal effects of paying a bribe on 
time delays, by Home Corruption level when importing 
estimated by: 
𝑑𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦
𝑑𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑒
= 𝛽𝐵 + 𝛽𝐵𝐻 ∗ 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 
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Therefore, the cross term in our regression specification means that by interacting our dummy 
variable, 𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑒, with the continuous variable, 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙, it allows us to have 
different slopes of the Home Corruption level variable across the two different values which 
our 𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑒 variable can take on (1 or 0). This is illustrated by using a margins plot in figure 4 
and figure 5: 
Figure 6: Adjusted predictions of paying a bribe - Exporting 
Figure 7: Adjusted predictions of paying a bribe - Importing 
 
 
 
Figure 6 & 7. Adjusted predictions of paying a bribe on time 
delays, by Home Corruption level when exporting and 
importing. Source: Authors’ analysis based on data from 
Enterprise Surveys, various years. 
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6. Discussions and findings 
6.1 Basic results of corruption and time delays in ports  
This section focuses on examining whether bribes are correlated with time delays in ports on 
average, whereas the next sections focuses on the heterogeneity associated with a company’s 
willingness to pay for a better position based on the corruption level in a company’s home 
country.  
Our findings regarding the relationship between bribes and time delays can be found in Table 
3. In this model we regress the self-reported time delays in ports on a host of firm controls. 
All specifications include sector country and year dummies to ensure identification is based 
on comparing companies within the same country, in the same sector in a given year. In the 
first specifications, we do not include any firm controls, but do include sector, country and 
year dummies. The main reason for this is the fear of having to few observations relating to 
delay times in ports. However, we do want to examine if there are other factors to time delays 
besides bribe payments. In the second specification, we include firm controls to assess whether 
we can identify other relationships that affect the time delays in ports. Standard errors are 
heteroscedastic robust and clustered by sector, country and year.  
The results show that corruption is associated with time delays in ports when companies 
export. We do notice that the effect of corruption is opposite for when companies are 
importing. When importing, corruption is associated with shorter time delays in ports. 
However, or findings is not statistically significant on either level and, therefore, we are not 
able to reject the null hypothesis that corruption is not correlated with time delays.  
The associated effects are economically meaningful; on average, companies that pay for a 
better position in ports must wait 2,68 days longer in ports when exporting, than companies 
not paying. Further, companies paying for a better position in port when importing, wait, on 
average, 0,45 days less in ports than companies not paying.   
We also notice that capital intense companies, are facing especially longer time delays when 
exporting, and companies with more experienced management, seems to spend less time in 
ports when importing. A possible reason for this may be because the port agents are able to 
charge bribes according to the company’s ability to pay, like demonstrated by Kaufmann and 
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Shang-Jin (1999). We can imagine that more capital intense companies possess higher abilities 
to pay than less capital intense companies, making the port agent impose larger time delays to 
extract larger bribes. More experienced managers may also be more experienced with ports 
processes, and therefore, better impose a more effective routine for the company, making them 
go through ports faster. However, none of the other variables are consistently statistically 
significant. Overall these specifications explain between 0,137 and 0,245 percent of the 
observed variance across firms. A robustness test of these findings can be found in Appendix 
1. 
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Table 3: Time delays in ports 
OLS - model     
Dependent variable:     
Time delays Exportin/Import     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Exporting Exporting Importing Importing 
 No controls Firm Controls No controls Firm Controls 
     
Bribes related to Importing   -1.124 -0.448 
   (0.859) (2.136) 
Bribes related to Exporting 1.073 2.679   
 (0.898) (2.125)   
Labor  -0.441  -1.194 
  (0.444)  (0.692) 
Capital per worker (log)  0.354**  -0.769 
  (0.174)  (1.509) 
Management’s experience  0.00169  -0.197* 
  (0.0656)  (0.0911) 
Firm age  0.0699  -0.0302 
  (0.0473)  (0.0501) 
Public  -0.604  8.150 
  (1.267)  (10.25) 
Private  -0.0177  14.34 
  (1.509)  (15.90) 
Partnership  1.191  3.325 
  (1.029)  (5.771) 
Government contract  1.347  2.997 
  (1.640)  (2.699) 
Time spent with regulations  1.025  3.566 
  (1.510)  (1.839) 
     
Observations 3,132 586 4,789 114 
R-squared 0.137 0.245 0.165 0.163 
Sector dummies YES YES YES YES 
Country dummies YES YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Standard errors are heteroscedastic robust and clustered by country, sector and year. 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data from Enterprise Surveys, various years.  
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6.2 Which companies pays for a better position? 
Table 4: Level of Corruption pr. Country: All services 
Country 
Corruption 
Proportion 
Country 
Corruption 
Proportion 
    
Cambodia 69,42 % China 11,93 % 
Yemen 58,16 % Burkina Faso 11,48 % 
Congo 51,75 % Bulgaria 11,27 % 
Pakistan 46,37 % Lithuania 10,97 % 
Guinea 41,58 % Guyana 10,00 % 
Liberia 39,65 % Vanuatu 9,94 % 
Sierra Leone 39,62 % Bosnia and Herzegovina 9,57 % 
Bangladesh 38,10 % North Macedonia 9,56 % 
South Sudan 37,61 % Suriname 9,46 % 
Nigeria 36,62 % Romania 9,34 % 
Mali 35,17 % Lesotho 8,82 % 
Lao 34,95 % Zimbabwe 8,44 % 
Mauritania 34,32 % Brazil 8,43 % 
Chad 33,52 % Ecuador 8,35 % 
Myanmar 31,97 % Costa Rica 8,06 % 
Solomon Islands 31,40 % Bolivia 7,99 % 
Benin 30,70 % Honduras 7,70 % 
Kyrgyz Republic 29,85 % Kosovo 7,51 % 
Ghana 29,55 % Guatemala 7,41 % 
Tajikistan 28,52 % Zambia 7,30 % 
India 28,27 % Argentina 7,29 % 
Ukraine 27,50 % Djibouti 7,14 % 
Indonesia 27,45 % Trinidad and Tobago 7,14 % 
Iraq 26,90 % Dominican Republic 6,98 % 
Nepal 26,87 % Nicaragua 6,65 % 
Vietnam 26,35 % Fiji 6,40 % 
Gambia 25,97 % Venezuela 6,18 % 
Burundi 25,36 % Eswatini 6,07 % 
Afghanistan 25,20 % Rwanda 5,35 % 
Cameroon 24,78 % Montenegro 5,33 % 
Lebanon 23,93 % Thailand 5,05 % 
Mongolia 22,92 % Jamaica 5,00 % 
Timor-Leste 22,89 % Turkey 4,80 % 
Azerbaijan 22,63 % Cape Verde 4,55 % 
Kazakhstan 22,18 % Poland 4,46 % 
Egypt 20,79 % Italy 4,41 % 
Angola 20,58 % Latvia 4,36 % 
Ethiopia 20,47 % Grenada 4,26 % 
Albania 20,18 % Namibia 4,22 % 
Kenya 20,04 % Croatia 4,16 % 
Malawi 18,96 % Czech Republic 4,07 % 
Malaysia 17,26 % Georgia 4,02 % 
Papua New Guinea 17,24 % West Bank and Gaza 3,78 % 
Samoa 17,17 % El Salvador 3,71 % 
Niger 16,95 % Colombia 3,64 % 
Guinea Bissau 16,78 % Botswana 3,54 % 
Mozambique 16,39 % Greece 3,48 % 
Congo 16,00 % Slovak Republic 3,48 % 
Tanzania 15,94 % Panama 3,29 % 
Madagascar 15,87 % Micronesia 3,13 % 
Paraguay 15,83 % Belarus 3,07 % 
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Gabon 15,79 % Mauritius 2,80 % 
Russia 15,73 % Estonia 2,78 % 
Central African 15,49 % Hungary 2,55 % 
Philippines 14,85 % South Africa 2,52 % 
Moldova 14,85 % Chile 2,51 % 
Uganda 14,52 % Uruguay 2,02 % 
Tonga 14,12 % Slovenia 1,85 % 
Togo 13,99 % Sweden 1,79 % 
Morocco 13,56 % St Vincent and Grenadines 1,56 % 
Bahamas 13,16 % Bhutan 1,34 % 
Gambia  13,14 % St Kitts and Nevis 0,98 % 
Uzbekistan 13,07 % Jordan 0,93 % 
Peru 13,00 % Israel 0,86 % 
Sierra Leone 12,75 % Malta 0,70 % 
Armenia 12,73 % Antigua and Barbuda 0,00 % 
Côte d'Ivoire 12,63 % Barbados 0,00 % 
Senegal 12,58 % Belize 0,00 % 
Sudan 12,57 % Cyprus 0,00 % 
Serbia 12,50 % Dominica 0,00 % 
Tunisia 12,50 % Eritrea 0,00 % 
Mexico 12,43 % St Lucia 0,00 % 
Sri Lanka 12,12 %   
 
Countries ranked from the most corrupt country, to the least corrupt country, measured 
by the proportion of companies within a country reporting to have been expected to 
pay a bribe in relation to gaining construction permits, operating licenses, electrical 
licenses, imports and exports.  
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data from Enterprise Surveys, various years. 
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Table 5: Level of Corruption pr. Country: Exports and Imports 
EXPORTS IMPORTS 
Country 
Corruption 
proportion 
(exporting) 
Country 
Corruption 
proportion 
(importing) 
    
Timor Leste 79,17 % Lao 38,20 % 
Sierra Leone 66,67 % Myanmar 37,25 % 
Guinea 50,00 % Cameroon 37,04 % 
Solomon Islands 45,45 % Mali 30,56 % 
Mali 43,48 % Chad 26,67 % 
Cambodia 42,86 % Guinea 25,00 % 
Liberia 42,86 % Liberia 25,00 % 
Myanmar 35,14 % Albania 24,12 % 
Lao 34,38 % Gambia  22,22 % 
Albania 26,80 % Kyrgyz Republic 20,86 % 
Vietnam 26,09 % Sierra Leone 20,00 % 
Philippines 19,91 % Kenya 18,67 % 
Egypt 19,08 % Egypt 18,44 % 
Kyrgyz Republic 17,95 % Mozambique 17,86 % 
Indonesia 17,89 % Argentina 16,23 % 
Kenya 16,79 % Benin 15,63 % 
Mozambique 15,00 % Togo 15,63 % 
Mongolia 13,64 % Mongolia 13,87 % 
Malaysia 13,16 % Côte d'Ivoire 13,64 % 
Gambia  11,11 % Suriname 11,11 % 
Nicaragua 11,11 % Niger 10,00 % 
Ethiopia 8,57 % Honduras 9,30 % 
Benin 8,33 % Zimbabwe 8,97 % 
Togo 7,41 % Nicaragua 8,70 % 
Ecuador 7,14 % Paraguay 7,95 % 
Cameroon 6,25 % Ethiopia 7,75 % 
Lesotho 6,25 % Lesotho 7,69 % 
Argentina 5,60 % Montenegro 7,50 % 
Zimbabwe 4,92 % Russia 7,14 % 
Russia 4,76 % Guatemala 6,76 % 
Italy 3,91 % Bolivia 5,93 % 
El Salvador 3,91 % Ecuador 4,29 % 
Uruguay 2,70 % Uruguay 3,87 % 
Guatemala 2,50 % West Bank and Gaza 3,23 % 
Greece 1,89 % Bhutan 3,03 % 
Peru 1,65 % Peru 2,70 % 
Turkey 1,38 % Eswatini 2,63 % 
Thailand 0,75 % Italy 2,37 % 
Colombia 0,72 % Dominican Republic 2,22 % 
Belarus 0,65 % Turkey 2,04 % 
Bhutan 0,00 % El Salvador 1,99 % 
Bolivia 0,00 % Greece 1,42 % 
Chad 0,00 % Colombia 1,28 % 
Cyprus 0,00 % Belarus 0,00 % 
Côte d'Ivoire 0,00 % Cyprus 0,00 % 
Dominican Republic 0,00 % Malta 0,00 % 
Eswatini 0,00 %   
Honduras 0,00 %   
Malta 0,00 %   
Montenegro 0,00 %   
Niger 0,00 %   
Papua New Guinea 0,00 %   
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Paraguay 0,00 %   
Suriname 0,00 %   
West Bank and Gaza 0,00 %   
 
Countries ranked from the most corrupt country, to the least corrupt country, measured 
the proportion of companies within a country reporting to have been expected to pay a 
bribe in relation to imports and exports.  
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data from Enterprise Surveys, various years. 
 
To set the stage for the following analysis on heterogeneity, we first study which country that 
possesses the largest level of corruption by examining the proportion of corrupt bureaucrats 
within specific services. First, we study the corruption level across a broad variety of services 
where decision-makers typically possesses high levels of discretionary powers. We include 
the services; application for construction permits, operating license, and electrical license, as 
well as direct imports and exports. These findings are reported in Table 4. Further, we 
concentrate the sample to include imports and exports only. Table 5, presents the level of 
corruption in ports sorted by the most corrupt country for imports and exports.  
In the following, we examine the probability that a company pays for a better position in the 
queue, sorted by their home country. To do this, we run a simple probit model with a binary 
indicator of whether or not the company payed for a better position in regards to exporting 
and/or importing as the dependant variable. Our findings are presented in Table 6.  
In the first and third specification, we do not include any firm controls other that the level of 
corruption in the company’s home country. The main reason for this is the fear of having to 
few observations relating to delay times in ports. However, we do want to examine if there are 
other factors to bribe payments besides the corruption level. In the second and fourth 
specification, we include firm controls to assess whether we can identify other relationships 
that affect the choice of paying for a better position in ports. All specifications include sector, 
country and year dummies. Standard errors are heteroscedastic robust and clustered by sector, 
country and year.   
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Table 6: Who pays for a better position?  
Probit Model Marginal Effects     
Dependant variable:     
Bribes related to Exporting/Importing     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Exporting 
No Controls 
Exporting 
Firm Controls 
Importing 
No Controls 
Importing 
Firm Controls 
     
Home Corruption level -0.00379* 0.0197***   
Exporting (0.00213) (0.00425)   
Home Corruption level   0.00704*** 0.0212*** 
Importing   (0.00242) (0.00522) 
Labor  0.0132  -0.0289 
  (0.0109)  (0.0239) 
Capital per worker (log)  -0.0204***  0.0506*** 
  (0.00757)  (0.0170) 
Management’s experience  -0.00105  0.00230*** 
  (0.00163)  (0.000228) 
Firm age  -0.00270**  -0.00222*** 
  (0.00125)  (0.000551) 
Public  0.0953  0.136* 
  (0.0742)  (0.0712) 
Private  0.00887   
  (0.0500)   
Partnership  -0.0233  -0.0302 
  (0.0435)  (0.0256) 
Government contract  -0.0349  0.0458** 
  (0.0586)  (0.0212) 
Time spent with regulators  0.103***  -0.0752 
  (0.0371)  (0.0694) 
     
Observations 3,307 548 5,002 103 
Pseudo R2 0.198 0.219 0.130 0.300 
Sector dummies YES YES YES YES 
Country dummies YES YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Standard errors are heteroscedastic robust and clustered by country, sector and year. 
Standard errors are reported in brackets. 
Reported numbers are based on the marginal effects of the explanatory variable. 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data from Enterprise Surveys, various years. 
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Overall, these models explain a moderate share of variance, with pseudo 𝑅2s ranging from 
0,130 to 0,300. The results yield a number of interesting associations. To start with, we see 
that capital intensity matters; the marginal effects calculated at the sample mean suggests that 
more capital intense companies are up to 5 percent more likely to pay for a better position in 
the queue when importing. However, this effect seems to be opposite for exporting, indicating 
that more capital intense companies are up to 2 percent less likely to pay for a better position 
when importing. Older companies are 0,2 percent less likely to pay, but companies with more 
experienced management are 0,2 percent more likely to pay.  We also notice that there is a 
statistically significant association between paying for a better position and the time spent with 
regulators, as well as if companies are doing business with the government.  
However, the most interesting findings in these data is that there is a statistically significant 
association between whether a company pays for a better position and the level of corruption 
in the company’s home country. Companies from more corrupt countries are 1,2 and 1,1 
percent more likely to pay for a better position when exporting and importing respectively. 
These findings are statistically significant on the 1 percent level, when including firm controls.  
Note that the other variables are not systematically statistically significant predictors of 
companies paying for better positions. In particular, we do not find evidence for differential 
treatment of firms based on ownership and company size.  
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6.3 Heterogeneity: Time delays and the level of corruption 
Now that we have investigated the effects of paying for a better position and demonstrated 
which firms that are more likely pay for a better position, we turn to the results of focal interest, 
notably whether the data demonstrate heterogeneity in the relationship between time delays 
and the level of corruption in a company’s home country. 
Table 7: Heterogeneity: Home Country’s Corruption Level 
OLS – model: Interaction model     
Depending variable:     
Time delays     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Exporting Exporting Importing Importing 
     
Bribes related to Exporting 0.436 3.266   
 (1.198) (3.319)   
Home Corruption level -0.0842** 0.0472   
(Exports) (0.0422) (0.0827)   
Interaction term: Bribe* 0.0319 -0.0240   
Home Corruption level 
(Exports) 
(0.0409) (0.0626)   
Bribes related to Importing   -0.680 -6.343 
   (1.956) (4.837) 
Home Corruption level   -0.582*** 3.050*** 
(Imports)   (0.0996) (0.325) 
Interaction term: Bribe*   -0.0256 0.832 
Home Corruption level 
(Import) 
  (0.0896) (0.467) 
     
Observations 3,132 586 4,789 114 
R-squared 0.273 0.298 0.301 0.276 
Sector dummies YES YES YES YES 
Country dummies YES YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES 
Firm Controls NO YES NO YES 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Standard errors are heteroscedastic robust and clustered on sector, country and year 
Firm controls are Labor, Capital per worker, Management’s experience, Firm age, Public, 
Private, Partnership, Government Contract and Time spent with regulations, ref. Table 2 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data from Enterprise Surveys, various years 
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Table 7 explores whether the association between paying for a better position in a queue and 
time delays is heterogeneous across firms. All specifications include sector, country and year 
dummies, and the error term is heteroscedastic robust and clustered on sector, country and 
year. Overall, these models explain a moderate share of variance, with 𝑅2s ranging from 0,273 
to 0,301. In the first and third specification, the bribe indicator is interacted with the level of 
corruption in a company’s home country to assess whether the impact of paying for a better 
position on time delays in ports varies with the level of corruption in a company’s home 
country (perhaps because the cost of corruption in high corrupt countries is lower, so they are 
more willing to pay, or they are more able to effectively influence through bribery). We do 
not include firm controls in the first and third specification, in fear of having to few 
observations to make reasonable predictions. In the second and fourth specification, we 
include the same firm controls as our model in Table 3 and Table 6. When controlling for firm 
controls, the estimated interaction effects are positive for exporting companies, but negative 
for importing companies. When we include the firm controls, we notice that the estimated 
effects switch, meaning that they become negative for exporting companies and positive for 
importing companies. Although we end up with opposite effects for exporting and importing, 
the effects are not statistically significant on any of the levels. Therefore, we do not find 
evidence that companies from more corrupt home countries experience shorter waiting times 
in ports than companies from less corrupt countries.  
We are aware of the possible weaknesses of a small amount of observations in our data set. 
Therefore, we found it necessary to include some robustness test for the model. The results of 
these robustness tests provide stronger evidences to our hypothesis postulating that companies 
from more corrupt home countries experience shorter waiting times than companies from less 
corrupt countries.  
The results can be found in our appendix, Appendix 3.  
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7. Conclusion 
In recent times, there has been an increasing availability of micro-data analysis and literature 
on the impact of corruption on firm-performance, its impact on efficiency and distortion of 
allocation of resources. It exists a large amount of literature contradicting the predictions 
growing from the second-best theory. In addition, there exists some literature trying to explain 
the heterogeneity in the association between paying for a better position and time delays, 
depending on firm’s willingness to pay and avoid bribes. However, quantitative analysis on 
this subject in relation to a country’s corruption level seems to be neglected to date. Yet, 
whether corruption is associated with accelerated port efficiency is at the very heart of the 
debate about whether corruption obstructs private sector development by diverting private 
companies away from corrupt ports, or instead enables it by allowing firms to mitigate the 
negative effects of burdensome bureaucracy. Time delays in ports may be a good metric for 
assessing public sector performance and delaying customs processes as well as other port 
services is a centralized area in which public officials have the opportunity to affect firm 
performance. This is also material in regards to the competition aspect between firms, as public 
officials opportunity to affect company performance may render bribing more efficient for 
some companies rather than others.  
By using The World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys from 145 countries, this master’s thesis 
examines the effect corruption has on waiting times in ports and the possible heterogeneity in 
the relationship between corruption and waiting times, depending on the corruption level 
found in a company’s home country.  
To start with, we tested the effects of corruption on waiting times in ports and whether 
introducing the problem of bribes had an efficiency effect on the port process. Our data did 
not find significant evidence to support this hypothesis. The results in our main model 
regarding this hypothesis, was not statistically significant for either imports nor exports. Thus, 
we are not able to reject the null hypothesis that corruption is not correlated with time delays 
based on our main model, we can look towards the results of our robustness test, found in 
Appendix 2, and then reject the hypothesis. Instead of efficiency effects of corruption, we 
found the same results as Freund et al. (2016); an inefficiency effect of corruption, leading to 
longer waiting times in general. If we interpret the results of our robustness test to also apply 
to ports, we can make the conclusion that corruption is in fact associated with longer waiting 
times in ports. 
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Second, we investigated an often-overlooked implication of the second-best theory; 
heterogeneity across companies in the relationship between paying for a better position and 
waiting times, with the speed of service increasing with a company’s willingness to pay. Our 
main model did not find significant evidence to support the hypothesis that paying companies 
from more corrupt home countries experience shorter waiting times in ports than paying 
companies from less corrupt countries. However, a robustness test of the model (found in 
Appendix 3) provided strong evidence that companies from more corrupt countries experience 
shorter waiting times when applying for a construction permit, operating license and/or 
electrical license. If we were to interpret these results to also apply to ports, we may keep the 
hypothesis that paying companies from more corrupt home countries experience shorter 
waiting times in ports than paying companies from less corrupt countries.  
To sum up, although we cannot establish causality and must cognizant of the limitations of 
self-reported subjective cross-sectional data, our findings show that companies paying for a 
better position in ports tend to experience longer rather than shorter waiting times. These 
results are consistent with the existing empirical literature on the distortion theory of 
corruption and supports the “sand in the wheels” theory.  
In addition, our findings confirm the hypothesis that paying companies from more corrupt 
countries experience shorter waiting times in ports than paying companies from less corrupt 
countries, confirming heterogeneity in the relationship between bribes and time delays across 
firms, depending on a company’s home country corruption level.  
Our results are highly relevant to the increased emphasis on world trade, with practical 
implications for private companies’ decision-making process regarding determination of their 
international shipping routes. Companies competing against companies from high corrupt 
countries may be more aware of the competition advantages of such companies being more 
able to effectively influence through bribery, and thereby decrease their waiting times. These 
results also provide practical implications in regards to enabling ship owners to take better 
decisions when encountering corruption in ports. Even though it might seem profitable to pay 
to skip the queue, the results in this master’s thesis proves otherwise. A possible political 
implication of our results is that international trade routes may be directed trough less corrupt 
countries in order for the trading companies to save cost of time. This would imply lower 
levels of international trade to the country, and slower economic growth.  
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Appendix 
1. Robustness – Basic results: Hypothesis #1 
Table 3.1: Time Delays for Exports & Imports as Log(1+Average days in ports) 
2. OLS - model     
Dependent variable:     
Log (1+Average days in port)     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Exporting Exporting Importing Importing 
 No controls Firm Controls No controls Firm Controls 
     
Bribes related to Importing   -0.0403 0.208** 
   (0.0437) (0.0532) 
Bribes related to Exporting 0.0307 0.0200   
 (0.0508) (0.112)   
Labor  -0.0154  -0.0995** 
  (0.0248)  (0.0326) 
Capital per worker (log)  0.0216*  -0.120 
  (0.0114)  (0.102) 
Management’s experience  -0.00298  -0.01000** 
  (0.00381)  (0.00255) 
Firm age  0.00453  -5.79e-05 
  (0.00269)  (0.00239) 
Public  -0.0481  0.661 
  (0.159)  (0.866) 
Private  -0.0954  0.529 
  (0.0963)  (0.529) 
Partnership  0.288***  -0.114 
  (0.0958)  (0.288) 
Government contract  0.0865  0.109 
  (0.101)  (0.143) 
Time spent with regulations  -0.0309  0.0236 
  (0.0725)  (0.129) 
     
Observations 3,132 586 4,789 114 
R-squared 0.273 0.295 0.300 0.276 
Sector dummies YES YES YES YES 
Country dummies YES YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
We take log (1+Time delays in ports): We use this transformation to allow for observations 
which reported clearing time to be zero 
Standard errors are heteroscedastic robust and clustered by country, sector and year. 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data from Enterprise Surveys, various years.  
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A possible data weakness is that some companies has reported clearing times to be zero or 
less. In order to account for this weakness, we transform our dependent variable, 𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑖,𝑠,𝑐,𝑡, 
to 𝐿𝑜𝑔(1 + 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡). This allows for observations which reported clearing 
time to be zero. Everything else in Table 3.1 is identical to Table 3. 
The results of this robustness test show that corruption is associated with time delays in ports. 
However, we only find a statistically significant association for corruption and time delays for 
imports. The results for exports are not statistically significant, and, therefore, we are not able 
to reject the null hypothesis that corruption is not correlated with time delays in ports for 
exports. For imports, we find that the association is statistically significant on the 5 percent 
level and robust when including proxies for firm characteristics.  
The associated effects are economically meaningful; on average, companies that pay for a 
better position in ports must wait 1,03 and 1,23 times longer in ports when exporting and 
importing respectively, then firms not paying; note that we take the exponent of the 
coefficients associated with corruption to arrive at these comparisons. We also notice that 
companies organized as partnerships, are facing especially longer time delays when 
exporting, Larger companies, as well as companies having more experienced management, 
seems to spend less time in ports when importing. However, none of the other variables are 
consistently statistically significant. Overall these specifications explain between 27 and 30 
percent of the observed variance across firms. 
 
Further, we include a robustness tests, where we look into the same model, but for other areas: 
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Table 3.2: Time Delays in other areas – dependent variable, Time delays = Average days 
spent. 
OLS - model    
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) 
Time delays Construction Permit Operating License Electrical License  
    
Bribes related to 21.15***   
Construction Permits (4.560)   
Bribes related to  16.03***  
Operating Licenses  (3.865)  
Bribes related to   11.37 
Electrical Permits   (7.535) 
    
Observations 3,365 5,507 3,388 
R-squared 0.239 0.308 0.239 
Sector dummies YES YES YES 
Country dummies YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES 
Firm controls YES YES YES 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Standard errors are heteroscedastic robust and clustered by country-year. 
Firm controls are Labor, Capital per worker, Management’s experience, Firm age, public, 
private, Partnership, government contract and Time spent with regulations, ref. Table 2. 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data from enterprise Surveys, various years. 
As we have mentioned, our data includes a very low amount of observations regarding 
corruption in ports. Therefore, we want to investigate whether we can observe the same 
associations as in Table 3, and possibly strengthen the robustness of our results. We look 
towards other areas where corrupt agents may control scarce values that involves a 
qualification steered allocation. Building on the same robustness test as Freund et al. (2016), 
Table 3.2 repeats the same analysis as we did in Table 3, only for time delays regarding 
construction permits, operating licenses and electrical licenses. We include the same firm 
controls as in Table 3, as well as sector, country and year dummies. Standard errors are 
heteroscedastic robust and clustered by sector, country and year.  
Column 1 reports the effect corruption has on time delays regarding construction permits, 
column 2 for an operating license and column 3 for an electrical license. We notice that the 
effect of corruption is positively associated with time delays and statistically significant for 
operating licenses and operating licenses. Further we want to account for the weakness that 
some firms reported zero average days to obtain such licenses.  
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In Table 3.3, we transform the dependent variables in this robustness test, to account for 
observations that reported average days of obtaining a construction license, an operating 
license and/or an electrical license to be zero: 
Table 3.3: Time Delays in other areas – dependent variable, Time delays = 
Log(1+Average days spent). 
OLS - model    
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) 
Log (1+Average days): Construction Permit Operating License Electrical License  
    
Bribes related to 0.360***   
Construction Permits (0.0536)   
Bribes related to  0.404***  
Operating Licenses  (0.0421)  
Bribes related to   0.338*** 
Electrical Permits   (0.0651) 
    
Observations 3,365 5,507 3,388 
R-squared 0.239 0.308 0.239 
Sector dummies YES YES YES 
Country dummies YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES 
Firm controls YES YES YES 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Standard errors are heteroscedastic robust and clustered by country-year. 
Firm controls are Labor, Capital per worker, Management’s experience, Firm age, public, 
private, Partnership, government contract and Time spent with regulations, ref. Table 2. 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data from enterprise Surveys, various years. 
In this table, each of the effect of corruption is significantly and positively associated with 
time delays. This is in accordance with the results found by Freund et al. (2016) and supports 
the associations found for exports in Table 3. By taking the exponent of the coefficients, we 
get that companies engaging in corruption when applying for a construction license, operating 
license or an electrical license tends to wait 1.43, 1.50 and 1,40 times as long as firms that did 
not engange in corruption. We clearly see that corruption may increase the waiting times 
instead of decreasing it.  
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2. Robustness – Basic results: Hypothesis #2 
Table 7.1: Time Delays in other areas – dependent variable, Time delays = Average days 
spent. No Firm Controls 
OLS – model: Interaction model    
Depending variable:    
Time delays    
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Construction 
Permit 
Operating 
License 
Electrical 
License 
    
Bribes related to Constr. Permit 69.16***   
 (9.015)   
Home Corruption level Construction 6.245***   
Permit (2.351)   
Interaction term: Bribe* -1.306***   
Home Corruption level 
Construction Permit 
(0.269)   
Bribes related to Oper. License  36.15***  
  (6.137)  
Home Corruption level Operating  -0.707  
License  (0.754)  
Interaction term: Bribe*  -1.021***  
Home Corruption level Operating 
License  
 (0.258)  
Bribes related to Electric License   31.75*** 
   (5.338) 
Home Corruption level Electrical   1.121 
License   (1.002) 
Interaction term: Bribe*   -0.729*** 
Home Corruption level Electrical 
License 
  (0.196) 
    
Observations 13,923 28,483 16,586 
R-squared 0.135 0.063 0.118 
Sector dummies YES YES YES 
Country dummies YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES 
Firm Controls NO NO NO 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Standard errors are heteroscedastic robust and clustered on sector, country and year. 
Firm controls are Labor, Capital per worker, Management’s experience, Firm age, 
public, private, Partnership, government contract and Time spent with regulations, ref. 
Table 2. 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data from Enterprise Surveys, various years 
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Table 7.2: Time Delays in other areas – dependent variable, Time delays = Average days 
spent. Including Firm Controls 
OLS – model: Interaction model    
Depending variable:    
Time delays    
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Construction 
Permit 
Operating 
License 
Electrical 
License 
    
Bribes related to Constr. Permit 48.07***   
 (13.04)   
Home Corruption level Construction -2.535   
Permit (5.705)   
Interaction term: Bribe* -1.002**   
Home Corruption level Construction 
Permit 
(0.410)   
Bribes related to Oper. License  39.41***  
  (12.79)  
Home Corruption level Operating  -2.840  
License  (2.796)  
Interaction term: Bribe*  -1.129**  
Home Corruption level Operating 
License  
 (0.465)  
Bribes related to Electric License   59.76*** 
   (19.28) 
Home Corruption level Electrical   7.110* 
License   (3.815) 
Interaction term: Bribe*   -2.258** 
Home Corruption level Electrical 
License 
  (1.108) 
    
Observations 3,365 5,507 3,388 
R-squared 0.184 0.139 0.170 
Sector dummies YES YES YES 
Country dummies YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES 
Firm Controls YES YES YES 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Standard errors are heteroscedastic robust and clustered on sector, country and year. 
Firm controls are Labor, Capital per worker, Management’s experience, Firm age, 
public, private, Partnership, government contract and Time spent with regulations, ref. 
Table 2. 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data from Enterprise Surveys, various years 
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As we have mentioned, our data includes a very low amount of observations regarding 
corruption in ports. Therefore, we want to investigate whether we can observe the same 
associations as in Table 7, and possibly strengthen the robustness of our results. We look 
towards other areas where corrupt agents may control scarce values that involves a 
qualification steered allocation. Table 7.1 and 7.2 repeats the same analysis as we did in Table 
7, only for time delays regarding construction permits, operating licenses and electrical 
licenses. Both tables include sector, country and year dummies, and the standard errors are 
heteroscedastic robust and clustered by sector, country and year. In Table 7.1, we do not 
include any firm controls to resemble the same test as the first and third specification in Table 
7. In contradiction to Table 7, we notice that the estimated interaction effects are negative and 
statistically significant on the 1 percent level when not including firms controls; the null 
hypothesis that companies from more corrupt countries are not able to get through ports faster 
must be rejected. This implies that paying companies from more corrupt countries have an 
advantage over paying companies from low corrupt companies when encountering corruption 
in ports. 
In Table 7.2, we include the same firm controls as in Table 7. We see that the estimated 
interaction effects are still negative and statistically significant on the 5 percent level. This 
implies stronger evidence that paying companies from more corrupt countries have an 
advantage over paying companies from low corrupt companies when encountering corruption 
in ports. 
The null hypothesis that companies from more corrupt countries are not able to get through 
ports must be rejected, also when including firm controls.   
To account for the same problems regarding companies reporting to have waited less than zero 
days for the various services, we repeat the models presented in Table 7.1 and 7.2 but 
transform the dependant variable in the same way as in Table 3.1; We transform our dependent 
variable, 𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑖,𝑠,𝑐,𝑡, to 𝐿𝑜𝑔(1 + 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑤𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠). 
The results are shown in Table 7.3 and 7.4. The interaction effects are still negative and 
statistically significant on the 1 percent level, providing the same evidence as Table 7.1 and 
7.2.  
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Table 7.3: Time Delays in other areas – dependent variable, Time delays = Log(1 + Time 
delays). No Firm Controls 
OLS – model: Interaction model    
Depending variable:    
Log(1 + Time delays)    
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Construction 
Permit 
Operating 
License 
Electrical 
License 
    
Bribes related to Constr. Permit 0.674***   
 (0.0677)   
Home Corruption level Construction 0.0154   
Permit (0.0269)   
Interaction term: Bribe* -0.00790***   
Home Corruption level Construction 
Permit 
(0.00239)   
Bribes related to Oper. License  0.638***  
  (0.0489)  
Home Corruption level Operating  0.0461***  
License  (0.0136)  
Interaction term: Bribe*  -0.0109***  
Home Corruption level Operating 
License  
 (0.00172)  
Bribes related to Electric License   0.621*** 
   (0.0664) 
Home Corruption level Electrical   -0.00971 
License   (0.0163) 
Interaction term: Bribe*   -0.0117*** 
Home Corruption level Electrical 
License 
  (0.00223) 
    
Observations 13,923 28,483 16,586 
R-squared 0.211 0.255 0.198 
Sector dummies YES YES YES 
Country dummies YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES 
Firm Controls NO NO NO 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Standard errors are heteroscedastic robust and clustered on sector, country and year. 
Firm controls are Labor, Capital per worker, Management’s experience, Firm age, 
public, private, Partnership, government contract and Time spent with regulations, ref. 
Table 2. 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data from Enterprise Surveys, various years 
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Table 7.4: Time Delays in other areas – dependent variable, Time delays = Log(1 + Time 
delays). including Firm Controls 
OLS – model: Interaction model    
Depending variable:    
Log(1 + Time delays)    
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Construction 
Permit 
Operating 
License 
Electrical 
License 
    
Bribes related to Constr. Permit 0.617***   
 (0.138)   
Home Corruption level Construction -0.0410   
Permit (0.0639)   
Interaction term: Bribe* -0.00957*   
Home Corruption level Construction 
Permit 
(0.00493)   
Bribes related to Oper. License  0.602***  
  (0.0904)  
Home Corruption level Operating  0.0361  
License  (0.0419)  
Interaction term: Bribe*  -0.00959***  
Home Corruption level Operating 
License  
 (0.00362)  
Bribes related to Electric License   0.789*** 
   (0.129) 
Home Corruption level Electrical   0.0220 
License   (0.0316) 
Interaction term: Bribe*   -0.0211*** 
Home Corruption level Electrical 
License 
  (0.00497) 
    
Observations 3,365 5,507 3,388 
R-squared 0.238 0.308 0.239 
Sector dummies YES YES YES 
Country dummies YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES 
Firm Controls YES YES YES 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Standard errors are heteroscedastic robust and clustered on sector, country and year. 
Firm controls are Labor, Capital per worker, Management’s experience, Firm age, 
public, private, Partnership, government contract and Time spent with regulations, ref. 
Table 2. 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data from Enterprise Surveys, various years 
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3. Description of all variables: 
Variables STATA name Variable Description Measure Survey Explanation: 
Time delays 
Exporting*: 
eportdays 
How many days it takes 
to clear ports exporting 
The average amount of 
days a company spend in 
port while exporting. 
In the last fiscal year, 
when the company 
exported goods directly, 
the average number of 
days that it took from the 
time the company’s goods 
arrived to their main point 
of exit (port) until the time 
these cleared customs. 
Time delays 
Importing*: 
iportdays 
How many days it takes 
to clear ports importing 
The average amount of 
days a company spend in 
port while exporting. 
In the last fiscal year, 
when the company 
imported goods, the 
average number of days 
that it took from the time 
the company’s goods 
arrived to their main point 
of entry (port) until the 
time these cleared 
customs. 
Bribes related to 
Exporting**: 
eportgift 
Dummy for corruption 
related to clearing ports 
exporting 
=1 If the company 
encountered corruption in 
ports while exporting - 
Proxy for paying for a 
better position in ports 
while exporting 
In clearing exports through 
customs, informal 
gift/payment expected or 
requested? 
Bribes related to 
Importing**: 
iportgift 
Dummy for corruption 
related to clearing ports 
importing 
=1 If the company 
encountered corruption in 
ports while exporting - 
Proxy for paying for a 
better position in ports 
while importing 
In clearing imports 
through customs, informal 
gift/payment expected or 
requested? 
Paid informal 
payments: 
bribeamount 
Dummy for reporting a 
perceived annual amount 
of informal payments 
=1 If a company reported 
an annual amount of 
informal gifts of payments 
regardless of type of 
service. 
Companies are sometimes 
required to make gifts or 
informal payments to 
public officials to “get 
things done” with regard 
to customs, taxes, licenses, 
regulations, services etc.  
On average, what percent 
of total annual sales, or 
estimated total annual 
value, do establishments 
like this one pay in  
informal payments or gifts 
to public officials for this 
purpose? 
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Countryonly: countryonly ID Variable for country 
Which home country of 
the company we are 
looking at  
Country 
Yearonly: yearonly ID Variable for year 
The fiscal year of the 
company we are looking at  
Year 
Country: i.countryonly Country Dummy Country-specific variance  N/A 
Year: i.yearonly Year Dummy Year-specific variance N/A 
Sector: i.sector Sector Dummy Sector-specific variance N/A 
Labor: lnLtot Proxy for form size 
The amount of full-time 
employees in the company 
– size-specific variance 
Num. permanent, full-time 
employees at end of last 
fiscal year 
Capital per worker 
(log): 
log_capital_per_
worker 
Proxy for capital 
intensity 
Capital intensity as capital 
divided by labor. Capital 
intensity-specific variance 
Cost for Establishment to 
Re-Purchase All of Its 
Machinery + Cost for 
Establishment to Re-
Purchase All of Its Land 
and Buildings. Designed to 
ascertain the market value 
of the company’s capital. 
Output per worker 
(log): 
L_output_pr_wo
rker 
Proxy for productivity  
Productivity as annual 
sales divided by labor. 
Productivity-specific 
variance 
Last Fiscal Year, what 
were the company’s total 
annual sales? / num. 
permanent, full-time 
employees at end of last 
fiscal year 
Management’s 
experience: 
b7 
Managements experience 
expressed in years 
Managements experience 
level. Experience-specific 
variance 
How many years of 
experience working in this 
sector does the top 
manager have? 
Firm age: firm_age The company’s age 
The age of the company as 
the current year (2019) 
minus the establishment 
year. age-specific variance 
Year establishment began 
operations 
Public: public 
Dummy for whether the 
company is publicly 
traded 
=1 if company is public. 
Ownership-specific 
variance 
Legal status of the firm 
Private: private Dummy for whether the =1 if company is private. Legal status of the firm 
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company is a private 
limited liability company 
Ownership-specific 
variance 
Partnership: partnership 
Dummy for whether the 
company is a partnership  
=1 if company is a 
partnership. Ownership-
specific variance 
Legal status of the firm 
Limited Partnership: limitedpartner 
Dummy for whether the 
company is a limited 
partnership 
=1 if company is a Limited 
Partnership. Ownership-
specific variance 
Legal status of the firm 
Sole Proprietorship: solepropship 
Dummy for whether the 
company is a sole 
proprietorship 
=1 if company is a Sole 
Proprietorship. 
Ownership-specific 
variance 
Legal status of the firm 
Foreign Owners: foreign 
Dummy for whether the 
company has foreign 
owners 
=1 if the company has 
foreign owners. 
Ownership-specific 
variance 
% Owned by private 
foreign individuals, 
companies or 
organizations 
Exporter: exporter 
Dummy for whether the 
company directly exports 
goods 
=1 if the company directly 
exports goods. Direct 
export-specific variance  
% Of Sales: direct exports 
Importer: importer 
Dummy for whether the 
company directly 
imports goods 
=1 if the company directly 
imports goods/supplies. 
Direct import-specific 
variance 
Were any of the material 
inputs and supplies 
imported directly? 
ISO certified: ISO 
Dummy for whether the 
company has an ISO-
certificate 
=1 if the company is ISO-
certified. Visibility-
specific variance: A 
company that is ISO-
certified has gone through 
processes including 
various audits, meaning its 
business are more visible.   
Does establishment have 
an internationally-
recognized quality 
certification? 
Formally registered: formal 
Dummy for whether the 
company is formally 
registered within their 
home country. 
=1 if the company is 
formally registered. 
Visibility-specific 
variance. Informal 
companies can operate 
much more freely as they 
are not monitored by 
stakeholders as much as 
formal registered 
companies. 
In what year was this 
establishment formally 
registered? 
Government 
contract: 
government_cont
ract 
Dummy for whether the 
company is doing 
business with the 
government 
=1 if company has a 
government contract. 
Public interaction-specific 
variance. 
Government contract 
secured (or attempted) in 
the last 12 months? 
Time spent with 
regulators: 
time_regulations 
Dummy for whether the 
company has spent time 
with regulators in the last 
fiscal year 
=1 if company spent time 
with regulations. 
Regulator interaction-
specific variance.  
What % of senior 
management time was 
spent in dealing with govt 
regulations? 
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Visited by tax 
officials: 
visited_taxofficia
ls 
Dummy for whether the 
company was visited by 
tax officials in the last fi 
=1 if the company was 
inspected by tax officials. 
Control by officials-
specific variance. 
Over the last 12 months, 
was this establishment 
inspected by tax officials? 
Externally financed: ext_financed 
Dummy for whether the 
company was externally 
financed 
=1 if the company is 
externally financed. 
Finance-specific variance. 
To test whether externally 
financed companied 
engage in corruption more 
often.  
Establishment has a line of 
credit or loan from a 
financial institution? 
Financial Statement 
Audited: 
audited 
Dummy for whether the 
company’s financial 
statement was audited 
=1 if FS is audited. 
External check-specific 
variance. Test if 
companies with more 
external checks engage 
more or less in corruption. 
Financial Statements 
checked & certified by 
external auditor in last 
fiscal year? 
Performance 
bonuses: 
bonus 
Dummy for whether the 
company has 
performance bonus 
schemes for management 
=1 if there were 
performance bonuses. 
Incentive-specific 
variance. Test if incentives 
trigger more corruption 
Was there performance 
bonuses based on 
production targets? 
Est. separated from 
HQ: 
separate 
Dummy for whether the 
company was separated 
from the headquarters 
=1 if company was located 
separate from HQ. HQ 
control-specific variance. 
Test if the variance is 
explained by having less 
control from HQ.  
Type of establishment: 
Establishment physically 
separated from HQ and  
other establishments of the 
same firm or 
Establishment physically 
separated from HQ but  
with other establishments 
of the same firm 
Home Corruption 
level - Exporting 
corruptionlevel_
ex 
Proportion of corruption 
in port when exporting, 
sorted by a company’s 
home country.  
Corruption level-specific 
variance. Measured by 
percent of companies 
reporting corrupt 
encounters when 
exporting, sorted by home 
country. 
In clearing exports through 
customs, informal 
gift/payment expected or 
requested? – Sum of “yes” 
answers sorted by the 
company’s home country. 
Home Corruption 
level - Importing 
corruptionlevel_i
m 
Proportion of corruption 
in port when importing, 
sorted by a company’s 
home country. 
Corruption level-specific 
variance. Measured by 
percent of companies 
reporting corrupt 
encounters when 
importing, sorted by home 
country. 
In clearing imports 
through customs, informal 
gift/payment expected or 
requested? – Sum of “yes” 
answers sorted by the 
company’s home country. 
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Corrupt courts: corruptcourt 
Dummy variable for 
companies reporting a 
corrupt court system in 
their country. 
=1 if company reported 
strongly disagree and 
disagrees with the 
statement. Court-specific 
variance 
Some statements that 
describe the courts and the 
way government officials 
interpret laws  
and regulations that affect 
this establishment’s 
business. For each 
statement, please tell me if 
you Strongly  
disagree, tend to disagree, 
Tend to agree, or Strongly 
agree. “The court system is 
fair, impartial and 
uncorrupted” 
Law/Regulations 
not predictable: 
notpredictable 
Dummy for whether the 
company finds the laws 
and regulations not 
predictable 
=1 if company reported 
strongly disagree and 
disagrees with the 
statement. Regulation-
specific variance 
Some statements that 
describe the courts and the 
way government officials 
interpret laws  
and regulations that affect 
this establishment’s 
business. For each 
statement, please tell me if 
you Strongly  
disagree, tend to disagree, 
Tend to agree, or Strongly 
agree. “Government 
officials’ interpretations of 
the laws and regulations  
affecting this 
establishment are 
consistent and 
predictable.”. 
Burdensome tax 
administration: 
taxobs 
Dummy for companies 
reporting that tax 
administration is a Major 
or very Severe obstacle 
of their operations 
=1 if company reported tax 
administrations to be a 
major or very severe 
obstacle of doing business. 
Burdensome bureaucracy-
specific variance 
List some of many factors 
that can affect the current 
operations of a business, 
please look at this card and  
tell me if you think that 
each factor is No Obstacle, 
a Minor Obstacle, a Major 
Obstacle, or a Very Severe  
Obstacle to the current 
operations of this 
establishment.  
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Political instability: politicobs 
Dummy for companies 
reporting that political 
instability is a Major or 
Very Severe obstacle of 
their operations 
=1 if company reported tax 
administrations to be a 
major or very severe 
obstacle of doing business. 
Burdensome bureaucracy-
specific variance 
List some of many factors 
that can affect the current 
operations of a business, 
please look at this card and  
tell me if you think that 
each factor is No Obstacle, 
a Minor Obstacle, a Major 
Obstacle, or a Very Severe  
Obstacle to the current 
operations of this 
establishment.  
Burdensome trade 
regulations: 
customsobs 
Dummy for companies 
reporting that customs 
regulations is a Major or 
Very Severe obstacle of 
their operations 
=1 if company reported tax 
administrations to be a 
major or very severe 
obstacle of doing business. 
Burdensome bureaucracy-
specific variance 
Do you think that customs 
and trade regulations are 
No Obstacle, a Minor 
Obstacle, a Major 
Obstacle, or a Very Severe 
Obstacle to the current 
operations of this 
establishment? 
Burdensome courts: courtobs 
Dummy for companies 
reporting that courts is a 
Major or Very Severe 
obstacle of their 
operations 
=1 if company reported tax 
administrations to be a 
major or very severe 
obstacle of doing business. 
Burdensome bureaucracy-
specific variance 
List some of many factors 
that can affect the current 
operations of a business, 
please look at this card and  
tell me if you think that 
each factor is No Obstacle, 
a Minor Obstacle, a Major 
Obstacle, or a Very Severe  
Obstacle to the current 
operations of this 
establishment.  
* The variables for Time delays relating to other regulatory policies, such as construction 
permits, operating license and electrical license are identical.  
** The variables for Bribe relating to other regulatory policies, such as construction permits, 
operating license and electrical license are identical. 
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